SIM Registration by Country
Compare each jurisdiction's accepted SIM-registration requirements by requirement type, and read every typed gap as unanswered rather than as an exemption or permission. The table omits the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Thailand because the official sources read did not settle every listed requirement in those jurisdictions.
/* Not legal advice. This page is research, not compliance guidance. */ /* */
SIM registration by country
SIM registration duties differ by jurisdiction and stage; this matrix reports each accepted authority, identity, activation, retention, and source-scope requirement separately while leaving unsupported fields as typed gaps.
Read each jurisdiction requirement by requirement. An authority row identifies the cited rule source; identity, tourist, eSIM, biometric, purchase-versus-activation, retention, and source-scope rows answer different questions and cannot substitute for one another.
The accepted United Arab Emirates record illustrates the stage distinction. A licensee must complete registration before activating service for a new mobile consumer and notify the consumer of registration and activation success or failure within 48 hours. That answer belongs to the cited United Arab Emirates rule and is not generalized to another jurisdiction.
An answered row states only what its accepted government source supports. A typed gap remains unanswered, and a proposal, prospective provision, enacted rule, operative rule, and evidenced not-applicable result retain their separate source-bounded meanings.
- Start with the authority and source-scope rows for the jurisdiction.
- Read the identity and purchase-versus-activation rows as separate requirements.
- Check retention independently; an activation rule does not supply a retention period.
- Keep every typed gap unresolved unless the accepted cell supplies a publishable answer.
| Jurisdiction | Accepted requirement |
|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates: authority | TDRA's Mobile Subscriber Registration Requirements initiative requires licensed telecom providers to register subscriber data accurately with proper documentation and prohibits issuing or transferring SIMs without full identity verification.source |
| United Arab Emirates: biometric rule | TDRA's current SIM FAQ specifies the original Emirates ID for SIM registration and permits UAE Pass for electronic data updates; it does not state a standalone biometric-capture requirement in the SIM rule itself.source |
| United Arab Emirates: esim rule | TDRA states that registration requirements apply to all types of mobile SIM cards used for voice or data; the cited rule does not create a separate eSIM exemption.source |
| United Arab Emirates: identity rule | For registration or renewal, citizens and residents use an Emirates ID; visitors use a passport or, for GCC citizens, a GCC national ID; institutions use an establishment card and valid trade licence.source |
| United Arab Emirates: purchase vs activation | A licensee must complete registration before activating service for a new mobile consumer and must notify the consumer of registration and activation success or failure within 48 hours.source |
| United Arab Emirates: retention | Licensees keep registration information while a SIM is active, retain deactivated-SIM registration records for at least 12 months, and keep the main Article 5.4 registration information across number statuses.source |
| United Arab Emirates: source scope | The source is TDRA's UAE mobile-subscriber registration initiative and applies to all licensed telecom providers; it is a regulator rule summary rather than a comparison of individual carrier products.source |
| United Arab Emirates: tourist rule | Visitors may obtain time-limited mobile SIMs using a passport and may register up to two SIM cards per service provider, compared with five per provider for residents.source |
| Switzerland: authority | The Swiss Federal Council promulgated VÜPF on 15 November 2017; the cited consolidation states 26 March 2024 and cites BÜPF as a legal basis.source |
| Switzerland: biometric rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedArt. 20a23 Erbringung des Identitätsnachweises bei natürlichen Personen bei Mobilfunkdiensten 1 Bei natürlichen Personen muss der Identitätsnachweis der oder des Teilnehmenden durch Vorzeigen eines der folgenden, am Erfassungstag gültigen Dokumente erbracht werden: a. einem schweizerischen oder ausländischen Reisepass; b. einer schweizerischen oder ausländischen Identitätskarte; oder c. einem Ausländerausweis gemäss den Artikeln 71 und 71a der Verordnung vom 24. Oktober 200724 über Zulassung, Aufenthalt und Erwerbstätigkeit. 2 Folgende Angaben der oder des Teilnehmenden werden erfasst: a. gestützt auf das Dokument: 1. Namen und Vornamen, 2. Geburtsdatum, 3. Art des Dokuments, dessen Nummer und das ausstellende Land bezie- hungsweise die ausstellende Organisation, 4. Nationalitäten; b. Adresse; c. falls bekannt: Beruf. 3 BeiKundenbeziehungen ohne Abonnementsverhältnis müssen zudem folgende Angaben erfasst werden: a. Zeitpunkt der Abgabe der Zugangsmittel oder der erstmaligen Aktivierung der Dienste; b. Name und vollständige Adresse der Abgabe- oder Aktivierungsstelle; c. Namen und Vornamen der erfassenden Person. 4 Die FDA oder gegebenenfalls die Wiederverkäuferin muss vom Originaldokument eine gut lesbare elektronische Kopie erstellen oder erstellen lassen. Die Wiederver- käuferin übermittelt die Angaben nach den Absätzen 2 und 3 sowie die Kopie inner- halb von 3 Tagen nach der Erfassung an die FDA.source |
| Switzerland: esim rule | The ordinance defines SIM to include a chip built into the device and expressly includes eSIM.source |
| Switzerland: identity rule | A person proves identity with a passport, identity card, or qualifying foreign-national identity card valid on the collection date. The recorded data include names, birth date, document type and number, issuing country or organisation, nationalities, address, and occupation if known; non-subscription relationships also record delivery or first-activation details and a readable electronic copy of the original document.source |
| Switzerland: purchase vs activation | The rule checks identity proof when access means are supplied or a mobile service is first activated; the reseller bears the duty when it directly performs that supply or activation.source |
| Switzerland: retention | Under the rule, providers of mobile services must retain the participant information specified in 20a and 20b and the identity-document copy throughout the customer relationship and for six months after it ends.source |
| Switzerland: source scope | A federal Q&A page published 17 November 2017 covers Swiss postal and telecommunications surveillance under the LSCPT and its implementing ordinances. It gives 1 March 2018 as their commencement date and says law-enforcement authorities must have the tools needed to investigate offences committed using new technologies.source |
| Switzerland: tourist rule | The rule accepts a valid foreign passport or foreign identity card as proof of identity.source |
| Germany: authority | TKG section 172 requires providers of the listed number-based interpersonal, internet-access, or signal-transmission services to collect and immediately store specified subscriber and service data before activation for the security-authority information procedures in sections 173 and 174.source |
| Germany: biometric rule | The permitted automated video-identification procedure requires live interaction and technical measures to detect manipulation of the person, identity document, and recordings.source |
| Germany: esim rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedMittels einer Verfügung wird geregelt, welche Verfahren zulässig sind, um die Daten eines künftigen Anschlussinhabers einer Prepaid - SIM -Karte auf Richtigkeit zu überprüfen.source |
| Germany: identity rule | Prepaid mobile providers must verify collected subscriber name, address, and date of birth data before activation when those data appear in submitted documents or consulted registers. Verification may use the listed identity documents or another suitable procedure determined by the Federal Network Agency, with a statutory identity document used before activation.source |
| Germany: purchase vs activation | Prepaid-SIM subscriber data must be verified against an identity document before the SIM card is activated.source |
| Germany: retention | Data collected under TKG section 172(1) through (3) must be deleted at the end of the calendar year following termination of the contractual relationship.source |
| Germany: source scope | The German Telecommunications Act was enacted on 23 June 2021, entered into force on 1 December 2021, and the retained consolidation records amendments through May 2026; section 172(2) applies enhanced verification to prepaid mobile-service providers.source |
| Germany: tourist rule | The listed verification documents include an official photo identification document recognized or admitted under immigration law, including a passport, identity card, or substitute document.source |
| Estonia: authority | The Electronic Communications Act governs retained mobile-service identifiers and expressly addresses anonymous prepaid-service activation metadata.source |
| Estonia: biometric rule | Biometric processing in the cited identity law concerns identity-document procedures; the prepaid activation rule itself records activation time and cell identifier, not biometrics.source |
| Estonia: esim rule | For Mobile-ID, digital-identification and signing certificates may be tied to a physical SIM or eSIM; this is a digital-document credential rule, not a general eSIM purchase-registration mandate.source |
| Estonia: identity rule | The Act expressly contemplates communications-service contracts where the customer's identity is not identified and separately names anonymous prepaid mobile service; it does not establish universal prepaid real-name registration.source |
| Estonia: purchase vs activation | For anonymous prepaid mobile service, the statutory data point is first activation date, time, and cell identifier, not purchase time.source |
| Estonia: retention | Covered mobile and internet communications metadata is retained for one year from the communication when created or processed in providing the service.source |
| Estonia: source scope | The SIM findings are limited to statutory subscriber/retention rules and the separate Mobile-ID credential provisions; they do not generalize Mobile-ID requirements to all SIM or eSIM sales.source |
| Estonia: tourist rule | The anonymous prepaid-service rule is not conditioned on Estonian citizenship or residence; the Act states no separate tourist registration rule for prepaid activation.source |
| France: authority | Article 29 of Law no. 2025-532 of 13 June 2025 amended CPCE Article L.34-1 to add prepaid interpersonal communications services and assign civil-identity verification conditions and exempt state services to a Conseil d'Etat decree.source |
| France: biometric rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedII bis.-Les opérateurs de communications électroniques sont tenus de conserver : 1° Pour les besoins des procédures pénales, de la prévention des menaces contre la sécurité publique et de la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale, les informations relatives à l'identité civile de l'utilisateur, jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de cinq ans à compter de la fin de validité de son contrat ou de son service de communications interpersonnelles avec prépaiement. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine les conditions dans lesquelles les opérateurs vérifient les données relatives à l'identité civile ainsi que les services de l'Etat qui ne sont pas soumis à cette vérification ;source |
| France: esim rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedII bis.-Les opérateurs de communications électroniques sont tenus de conserver : 1° Pour les besoins des procédures pénales, de la prévention des menaces contre la sécurité publique et de la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale, les informations relatives à l'identité civile de l'utilisateur, jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de cinq ans à compter de la fin de validité de son contrat ou de son service de communications interpersonnelles avec prépaiement. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine les conditions dans lesquelles les opérateurs vérifient les données relatives à l'identité civile ainsi que les services de l'Etat qui ne sont pas soumis à cette vérification ;source |
| France: identity rule | CPCE Article L.34-1 requires operators to retain users' civil-identity information for five years after the end of a contract or prepaid interpersonal communications service, while verification conditions and exempt state services are set by Conseil d'Etat decree.source |
| France: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedII bis.-Les opérateurs de communications électroniques sont tenus de conserver : 1° Pour les besoins des procédures pénales, de la prévention des menaces contre la sécurité publique et de la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale, les informations relatives à l'identité civile de l'utilisateur, jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de cinq ans à compter de la fin de validité de son contrat ou de son service de communications interpersonnelles avec prépaiement. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine les conditions dans lesquelles les opérateurs vérifient les données relatives à l'identité civile ainsi que les services de l'Etat qui ne sont pas soumis à cette vérification ;source |
| France: retention | The official Assembly report states that operators retain a user's civil-identity information for five years after the contract ends, while other subscription/account and payment information is retained for one year.source |
| France: source scope | The official report describes operator identification information as civil-status data, address, pseudonyms, and payment-related information; the matrix reports only the national legal scope and not provider implementation.source |
| France: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedII bis.-Les opérateurs de communications électroniques sont tenus de conserver : 1° Pour les besoins des procédures pénales, de la prévention des menaces contre la sécurité publique et de la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale, les informations relatives à l'identité civile de l'utilisateur, jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de cinq ans à compter de la fin de validité de son contrat ou de son service de communications interpersonnelles avec prépaiement. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine les conditions dans lesquelles les opérateurs vérifient les données relatives à l'identité civile ainsi que les services de l'Etat qui ne sont pas soumis à cette vérification ;source |
| Georgia: authority | Georgia's Electronic Communications Law and ComCom consumer regulation require properly executed subscriber contracts and correct customer identification for electronic communications service.source |
| Georgia: biometric rule | The SIM-specific provision authorises verification of application identifying data against the Public Service Development Agency database but enumerates no biometric-capture step; it does not establish a biometric requirement for the transaction.source |
| Georgia: esim rule | For mobile-number portability, the recipient operator must identify the person under the subscriber-identification rule before handing over a standard or electronic SIM; eSIM is therefore expressly within the same identification framework.source |
| Georgia: identity rule | When a service contract or remote transaction is made, a provider may verify the applicant's identifying data against the Public Service Development Agency database and may refuse service when non-contact data do not match and the applicant cannot be identified unambiguously.source |
| Georgia: purchase vs activation | In a mobile-number port, the recipient operator must conclude the subscriber contract no later than one hour before completion; absent a contract by then, the port stops. This distinguishes contract completion from final port activation.source |
| Georgia: retention | An electronic communications company may retain contract identity/contact/equipment-location/subscriber-number data for no more than four years after contract termination, and communication-identification and billing data for no more than four years after communication; expiry triggers deletion or destruction, with automated destruction completed within 30 days.source |
| Georgia: source scope | The SIM findings use the national Electronic Communications Law and ComCom's consumer-service regulation: the law requires properly executed contracts, while the regulation governs written/electronic contracts, remote transactions, subscriber identity/contact information, and correct identification.source |
| Georgia: tourist rule | The operative rule is applicant-neutral: it covers the person identified in a service-contract or remote-transaction application and states no separate tourist pathway or tourist exemption.source |
| Paraguay: authority | RD 0656/2008 requires mobile-service providers to maintain a user registry and establishes registration and stolen-terminal controls.source |
| Paraguay: biometric rule | The regulation requires identity-document copies and comparison with originals; it does not state that the provider must collect a biometric template for SIM registration.source |
| Paraguay: esim rule | Not applicable: the cited resolution text lists the terminal's electronic serial number and SIM card data generally and states no separate eSIM rule.source |
| Paraguay: identity rule | At activation, the sales agent must identify and register the user, verify the requesting person's identity document against the original, and retain the required identity or entity documents.source |
| Paraguay: purchase vs activation | Identification and registration attach to activation: the sales agent must complete the stated checks for activation, and the provider must receive the supporting documents within 30 days after activation.source |
| Paraguay: retention | For deactivated lines, the provider must retain the registered data for at least one year after service cancellation.source |
| Paraguay: source scope | CONATEL's official index labels RD 0656/2008 as the third version of the mobile-service user registration and identification rule.source |
| Paraguay: tourist rule | Not applicable: the cited resolution text lists the type, number and origin of the identity document and states no separate tourist registration route.source |
| Singapore: authority | The captured IMDA facilities-based operator licence schedule requires the licensee to maintain a postpaid SIM subscriber register for inspection by authorised Singapore government agencies.source |
| Singapore: biometric rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedOther safeguards were put in place for the registration of SIM cards such as requiring the use of government-issued identification documents for registration, disallowing the use of foreign passports to register for postpaid SIM cards, and requiring the use of Singpass for online registration.source |
| Singapore: esim rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedOther safeguards were put in place for the registration of SIM cards such as requiring the use of government-issued identification documents for registration, disallowing the use of foreign passports to register for postpaid SIM cards, and requiring the use of Singpass for online registration.source |
| Singapore: identity rule | IMDA states that SIM registration safeguards require government-issued identification, disallow foreign passports for postpaid SIM registration, and require Singpass for online registration. Separately, the 2018 EITC facilities-based operator licence requires production of the applicable identity card, passport, or Employment Pass before postpaid particulars are recorded, and requires a photocopy of that evidence.source |
| Singapore: purchase vs activation | For overseas or in-flight prepaid sales, the retailer must forward the customer's records within seven working days after purchase; postpaid registration procedures must occur before service activation.source |
| Singapore: retention | The licensee must keep prepaid customer records and postpaid subscriber records for at least 12 months from service termination.source |
| Singapore: source scope | In Singapore, IMDA, in consultation with the Singapore Police Force, states that from 28 February 2026 each person may register at most 10 postpaid SIM cards across all telcos.source |
| Singapore: tourist rule | IMDA states that foreign passports are disallowed for postpaid SIM registration, while government-issued identification and Singpass online registration are required. Separately, for prepaid registration, the 2018 EITC licence lists a passport and specified passes for a customer in Singapore and requires best-efforts identity verification through locally recognised documents for a customer outside Singapore.source |
| United States: authority | FCC 26-27 is a federal notice of proposed rulemaking that asks whether to impose prepaid-service KYC measures; it is not an adopted nationwide purchaser-identification rule.source |
| United States: biometric rule | The FCC SIM-change rule is performance-based: providers must use secure identity authentication and may not rely on specified readily available data; it does not prescribe a biometric method in the quoted rule.source |
| United States: esim rule | For the FCC SIM-change safeguards, SIM expressly includes both physical and virtual cards, so the change-authentication rule covers eSIM/virtual-SIM changes as well as physical SIM changes.source |
| United States: identity rule | The current FCC record asks what information providers obtain from prepaid-SIM purchasers and whether KYC should be imposed; the notice itself does not create a nationwide ID-at-purchase mandate.source |
| United States: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| United States: retention | CMRS providers must retain enumerated SIM-change request and authentication-measure metrics for at least three years.source |
| United States: source scope | FCC 26-27 states that its discussed KYC measures apply only to originating voice-service providers.source |
| United States: tourist rule | FCC 26-27 distinguishes prepaid/postpaid and retail/online channels but states no separate tourist or nonresident class; any carrier or state requirements need separate verification.source |
| American Samoa: authority | The Federal Communications Commission governs the captured CMRS SIM-change rule under sections 1, 2, 4, 201, 222, 251, 303, and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, implemented in 47 CFR parts 52 and 64.source |
| American Samoa: biometric rule | The captured FCC rule is performance-based: a CMRS provider must use secure methods reasonably designed to confirm identity before a SIM change and may not rely on listed readily available data. The operative paragraph does not prescribe a biometric method.source |
| American Samoa: esim rule | For the FCC SIM-change safeguards, SIM expressly includes both physical and virtual cards, so the change-authentication rule covers eSIM/virtual-SIM changes as well as physical SIM changes.source |
| American Samoa: identity rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedTake affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers from using its network to originate illegal calls, including knowing its customers and exercising due diligence in ensuring that its services are not used to originate illegal traffic.source |
| American Samoa: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| American Samoa: retention | CMRS providers must retain enumerated SIM-change request and authentication-measure metrics for at least three years.source |
| American Samoa: source scope | FCC 26-27 is a Federal Communications Commission Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking adopted April 30, 2026 and released May 1, 2026. Its KYC discussion applies only to originating voice-service providers and includes commercial mobile radio service; it seeks comment on prepaid and postpaid customer-information requirements and prepaid SIM sales through third-party vendors.source |
| American Samoa: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there differences in current industry KYC information collections based upon whether the customer is seeking prepaid or postpaid plans or whether the customer purchases a prepaid plan at a retail store or online?source |
| Guam: authority | FCC 26-27 is a federal notice of proposed rulemaking that asks whether customer-information requirements should vary for prepaid and postpaid service plans.source |
| Guam: biometric rule | For SIM changes, a CMRS provider must use secure methods reasonably designed to confirm identity; authentication may not rely on specified readily available biographical, account, recent-payment, or call-detail information unless otherwise permitted under 47 U.S.C. § 345 or Part 64, Subpart II.source |
| Guam: esim rule | For the FCC SIM-change safeguards, SIM expressly includes both physical and virtual cards, so the change-authentication rule covers eSIM/virtual-SIM changes as well as physical SIM changes.source |
| Guam: identity rule | The current FCC record asks what information providers obtain from prepaid-SIM purchasers and whether KYC should be imposed; the notice itself does not create a nationwide ID-at-purchase mandate.source |
| Guam: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| Guam: retention | A CMRS provider must track and maintain the enumerated SIM-change request, complaint, remediation, and authentication-measure data for a minimum of three years.source |
| Guam: source scope | FCC 26-27's discussed KYC measures are limited to originating voice-service providers.source |
| Guam: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there differences in current industry KYC information collections based upon whether the customer is seeking prepaid or postpaid plans or whether the customer purchases a prepaid plan at a retail store or online?source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: authority | The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), through the FCC 26-27 notice of proposed rulemaking, frames possible prepaid-service KYC measures; the notice asks questions and does not itself adopt a nationwide purchaser-identification rule.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: biometric rule | For SIM changes, a CMRS provider must use secure methods reasonably designed to confirm identity; authentication may not rely on specified readily available biographical, account, recent-payment, or call-detail information unless otherwise permitted under 47 U.S.C. § 345 or Part 64, Subpart II.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: esim rule | For the FCC SIM-change safeguards, SIM expressly includes both physical and virtual cards, so the change-authentication rule covers eSIM/virtual-SIM changes as well as physical SIM changes.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: identity rule | The current FCC record asks what information providers obtain from prepaid-SIM purchasers and whether KYC should be imposed; the notice itself does not create a nationwide ID-at-purchase mandate.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: retention | A CMRS provider must track and maintain the enumerated SIM-change request, complaint, remediation, and authentication-measure data for a minimum of three years.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: source scope | FCC 26-27's discussed KYC measures are limited to originating voice-service providers.source |
| Northern Mariana Islands: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there differences in current industry KYC information collections based upon whether the customer is seeking prepaid or postpaid plans or whether the customer purchases a prepaid plan at a retail store or online?source |
| Puerto Rico: authority | FCC 26-27 is a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, adopted April 30, 2026 and released May 1, 2026. Its KYC discussion applies only to originating voice service providers.source |
| Puerto Rico: biometric rule | The FCC requires secure authentication before a SIM change but departed from prescribing particular authentication methods, allowing providers flexibility to implement current and effective methods.source |
| Puerto Rico: esim rule | For SIM changes, 47 CFR § 64.2010(h) covers CMRS providers including wireless resellers, defines SIM to include physical or virtual cards, and requires secure authentication before the change subject to the stated Safe Connections Act and Part 64 exceptions.source |
| Puerto Rico: identity rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedTake affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers from using its network to originate illegal calls, including knowing its customers and exercising due diligence in ensuring that its services are not used to originate illegal traffic.source |
| Puerto Rico: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| Puerto Rico: retention | Wireless providers must track and maintain information about SIM-change requests and authentication measures for at least three years, including the enumerated request, fraud, complaint, remediation-time, and authentication-measure information categories.source |
| Puerto Rico: source scope | For SIM changes, 47 CFR § 64.2010(h) covers CMRS providers, including wireless resellers, and physical or virtual SIM cards; compliance with paragraph (h) is not required until the paragraph is removed or contains a compliance date.source |
| Puerto Rico: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there differences in current industry KYC information collections based upon whether the customer is seeking prepaid or postpaid plans or whether the customer purchases a prepaid plan at a retail store or online?source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: authority | The captured Report and Order was adopted under sections 1, 2, 4, 201, 222, 251, 303, and 332 of the Communications Act and amended 47 CFR parts 52 and 64.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: biometric rule | For SIM changes, a CMRS provider must use secure methods reasonably designed to confirm identity; authentication may not rely on specified readily available biographical, account, recent-payment, or call-detail information unless otherwise permitted under 47 U.S.C. § 345 or Part 64, Subpart II.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: esim rule | For the FCC SIM-change safeguards, SIM expressly includes both physical and virtual cards, so the change-authentication rule covers eSIM/virtual-SIM changes as well as physical SIM changes.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: identity rule | The current FCC record asks what information providers obtain from prepaid-SIM purchasers and whether KYC should be imposed; the notice itself does not create a nationwide ID-at-purchase mandate.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: purchase vs activation | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there KYC measures we can impose for prepaid service purchased through third-party vendors such as prepaid SIM cards? What, if any, customer information do wireless providers obtain from customers who purchase prepaid SIM cards?source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: retention | A CMRS provider must track and maintain the enumerated SIM-change request, complaint, remediation, and authentication-measure data for a minimum of three years.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: source scope | The discussed KYC measures apply only to originating voice-service providers.source |
| U.S. Virgin Islands: tourist rule | Unknown Not yet verifiedAre there differences in current industry KYC information collections based upon whether the customer is seeking prepaid or postpaid plans or whether the customer purchases a prepaid plan at a retail store or online?source |
Source: 14 jurisdictions. Each source link opens the authority for its cell. The page source record lists the capture date and snapshot for every cell.
Field definitions
- Accepted requirement
- The accepted government-source answer or typed gap for the jurisdiction and SIM-registration requirement named by the row.
eSIM and tourist-SIM rules
Tourist treatment and eSIM scope are independent: Thailand's cited tourist-SIM rule sets a 60-day limit and renewed identity registration for continued use, while Georgia's cited portability rule places standard and electronic SIMs in the same identification framework.
Thailand's accepted rule states that a foreign tourist SIM is limited to 60 days and cannot be extended by top-up; continued use after 60 days requires renewed identity registration with the provider. Georgia's accepted portability rule requires the recipient operator to identify the person before handing over a standard or electronic SIM.
Each example stays inside its source. The Thailand visitor-duration rule does not answer whether another jurisdiction treats a tourist differently, and the Georgia portability rule does not establish a general eSIM purchase mandate. Where an accepted eSIM or tourist field is unknown or not applicable, that status remains visible instead of being rewritten as an exemption.
For carrier-versus-VoIP acceptance, use the acceptance-and-verification section of VoIP and Carrier Numbers. For issuance and use of local carrier numbers abroad, use the carrier-numbers-abroad section of VoIP and Carrier Numbers. For masking, retention, and verification-trigger capabilities, use the Private Phone-Number App Comparison; this page does not restate product-specific facts.
- Tourist duration and eligibility come only from the jurisdiction's accepted tourist-rule row.
- eSIM scope comes only from an accepted rule that expressly includes or addresses an electronic or virtual SIM.
- A general identity rule does not create an unstated tourist pathway or eSIM exemption.
- Carrier acceptance, carrier numbers abroad, and product capabilities remain with their linked owner pages.
Biometric registration
Thailand's cited rule expressly uses real-time liveness detection for covered registrations and replacements, while the cited United States SIM-change rule requires secure authentication without prescribing a biometric method.
From 18 August 2025, Thailand's accepted source applies real-time liveness detection to new prepaid and postpaid registrations and same-number SIM replacements. The cited face check rejects photographs, videos, and three-dimensional masks and operates alongside original valid identity documents.
The accepted United States record states a different rule. A provider must use secure methods reasonably designed to confirm identity before a covered SIM change, but the cited rule does not prescribe a biometric method. That performance-based authentication duty is not rewritten here as facial or fingerprint capture.
The distinction controls every row: an explicit biometric or liveness requirement may be stated as such; a document requirement remains a document requirement; a secure-authentication duty remains performance based; and a typed gap supplies no biometric answer.
- Explicit biometric or liveness rule: state only the method and transaction scope the accepted source names.
- Document rule: do not infer biometric collection from an identity-card, passport, or document-comparison requirement.
- Performance-based authentication: do not insert a biometric method the rule does not prescribe.
- Typed gap: leave the biometric question unanswered.
How to read Unknown
- Unknown: Verified absence
- The captured authority was searched and shows no such rule or filing. No value is printed because the absence is the finding. The reason and the authority are printed beside the badge.
- Unknown: Not yet verified
- The captured sources did not settle this field yet. No value is printed, not even an earlier one. The reason is printed beside the badge, and an authority is linked only when one was supplied.