{ "cells": { "grain:m_communications_laws#AE.AE|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The internet guidance directly addresses UAE cloud/hosting providers, UAE-based users, companies, institutions, banks, licensees, and ISPs; restrictions turn on service function and approval, not a stated nationality test.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"eacbb0e521f0d7af04c669241b1feb70660b26279af00278a3d5471ec6728c01\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4a9057a632660b73aaa671758e4a37b38234a501d0c326714f8c827c7c5b4310\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The internet guidance directly addresses UAE cloud/hosting providers, UAE-based users, companies, institutions, banks, licensees, and ISPs; restrictions turn on service function and approval, not a stated nationality test.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "For additional clarification regarding VPN services:\n\n- The use of VPN technology by companies, institutions and banks to access their internal networks through internet is allowed. Please refer to the Official TDRA statement here.\n- Hosting VPN connections and services that serve UAE-based users and allow bypassing the ISPs filtration is strictly not allowed and might result in blocking access to your service by the ISPs in UAE.\n\nFor additional clarification regarding VoIP services:\n\n- Access to VoIP services serving UAE-based users that are provided in collaboration with the licensees or approved by the TDRA are allowed. Please refer to the list of approved VoIP service in UAE here.\n- Hosting or enabling access to any VoIP service falling outside of the above approvals is strictly not allowed and might result in blocking your service by the ISPs in UAE.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "AE", "row_key": "AE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://tdra.gov.ae/en/About/tdra-sectors/information-and-digital-government/departments/policy-and-programs-department/internet-guidelines", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#AE.AE|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "TDRA treats voice and video calls as regulated VoIP activity: service must be supplied by licensed UAE providers or in collaboration with them, subject to TDRA approval and exemption authority.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"eacbb0e521f0d7af04c669241b1feb70660b26279af00278a3d5471ec6728c01\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4a9057a632660b73aaa671758e4a37b38234a501d0c326714f8c827c7c5b4310\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"TDRA treats voice and video calls as regulated VoIP activity: service must be supplied by licensed UAE providers or in collaboration with them, subject to TDRA approval and exemption authority.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Voice and video calls are considered Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services that are a regulated activity in the UAE. Such services shall be provided by the licensed service providers or in collaboration with them. Kindly refer to the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Policy.\n\nThe licensed service provider in UAE are obliged to block the traffic of VoIP applications that are not in compliance, as it falls under the prohibited content category of Illegal communication services”. Kindly refer to the prohibited content categories.\n\nTDRA, at its sole discretion, may provide a VoIP exemption approval to allow VoIP applications in the UAE, taking into consideration the users and market demands and needs.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "AE", "row_key": "AE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://tdra.gov.ae/en/About/tdra-sectors/information-and-digital-government/departments/policy-and-programs-department/internet-guidelines", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#AE.AE|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "UAE Pass serves citizens, residents, and visitors. Citizens and residents register with an Emirates ID and active UAE mobile number and verify by facial recognition or kiosk; visitors may authenticate with a passport and eligible GCC users with a national ID.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"9a0a78b80a3a16693c5c17a1d51f75bfaad25cb14404fbf89ef34ccd192b62a8\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4a9057a632660b73aaa671758e4a37b38234a501d0c326714f8c827c7c5b4310\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"UAE Pass serves citizens, residents, and visitors. Citizens and residents register with an Emirates ID and active UAE mobile number and verify by facial recognition or kiosk; visitors may authenticate with a passport and eligible GCC users with a national ID.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Register & Create an Account\n\nFor UAE citizens and residents, you must have a valid Emirates ID and an active UAE mobile number.\n\n[Vector_person_face]\n\nVerify\n\nRegister using your Emirates ID number, verify your identity using facial recognition and set a security pin. Or you can visit the nearest UAE Pass kiosk with your Emirates ID.\n\nFind locations\n\n[person-pin]\n\nDon’t have an Emirates ID?\n\nVisitors can use the app by authenticating their information through other official identity documents, including passports, or if you are a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) citizen or resident, National ID can be used to create an account.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "AE", "row_key": "AE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://dgov.tdra.gov.ae/services/uae-pass", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#AE.AE|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "VoIP is allowed where supplied by or in collaboration with licensees or approved by TDRA, and TDRA may grant a discretionary VoIP exemption based on user and market needs.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"eacbb0e521f0d7af04c669241b1feb70660b26279af00278a3d5471ec6728c01\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4a9057a632660b73aaa671758e4a37b38234a501d0c326714f8c827c7c5b4310\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"VoIP is allowed where supplied by or in collaboration with licensees or approved by TDRA, and TDRA may grant a discretionary VoIP exemption based on user and market needs.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Voice and video calls are considered Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services that are a regulated activity in the UAE. Such services shall be provided by the licensed service providers or in collaboration with them. Kindly refer to the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Policy.\n\nThe licensed service provider in UAE are obliged to block the traffic of VoIP applications that are not in compliance, as it falls under the prohibited content category of Illegal communication services”. Kindly refer to the prohibited content categories.\n\nTDRA, at its sole discretion, may provide a VoIP exemption approval to allow VoIP applications in the UAE, taking into consideration the users and market demands and needs.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "AE", "row_key": "AE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://tdra.gov.ae/en/About/tdra-sectors/information-and-digital-government/departments/policy-and-programs-department/internet-guidelines", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#AE.AE|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The cited communications rule addresses voice and video calling as VoIP: unapproved applications are blocked, while approved or licensee-collaborating services may operate. It does not establish a blanket rule for ordinary text messages.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"eacbb0e521f0d7af04c669241b1feb70660b26279af00278a3d5471ec6728c01\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4a9057a632660b73aaa671758e4a37b38234a501d0c326714f8c827c7c5b4310\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The cited communications rule addresses voice and video calling as VoIP: unapproved applications are blocked, while approved or licensee-collaborating services may operate. It does not establish a blanket rule for ordinary text messages.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Voice and video calls are considered Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services that are a regulated activity in the UAE. Such services shall be provided by the licensed service providers or in collaboration with them. Kindly refer to the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Policy.\n\nThe licensed service provider in UAE are obliged to block the traffic of VoIP applications that are not in compliance, as it falls under the prohibited content category of Illegal communication services”. Kindly refer to the prohibited content categories.\n\nTDRA, at its sole discretion, may provide a VoIP exemption approval to allow VoIP applications in the UAE, taking into consideration the users and market demands and needs.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "AE", "row_key": "AE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://tdra.gov.ae/en/About/tdra-sectors/information-and-digital-government/departments/policy-and-programs-department/internet-guidelines", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#CH.CH|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "A few dozen of about 600 companies—the largest providers, beginning at 100 million in annual turnover—have complete surveillance obligations. Identification of end users applies to professionally operated public WLAN; smaller providers and education or research providers may receive reduced duties.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27a40ed436468a734587189c83804c03f87530cbac910e52a34b98914813a0fd\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"eadf9ab022995e54ddb2950b1370556a1feb762e8be74982555a58d0f8eb1337\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"A few dozen of about 600 companies—the largest providers, beginning at 100 million in annual turnover—have complete surveillance obligations. Identification of end users applies to professionally operated public WLAN; smaller providers and education or research providers may receive reduced duties.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "- 5. Sur quels points les dispositions ont-elles été adaptées après la consultation ?\n\n []\n\n Les ordonnances, qui ont également été soumises pour avis aux\n commissions des affaires juridiques du Parlement, ont été adaptées sur\n les points suivants :\n\n - Seuls doivent pouvoir être identifiés les utilisateurs finaux d'un\n réseau WLAN géré à titre professionnel, c'est-à-dire, par exemple,\n le réseau d'une gare ou d'un aéroport. De nombreux fournisseurs\n disposent aujourd'hui déjà de systèmes permettant d'identifier\n rapidement et simplement les utilisateurs, par exemple via un SMS.\n - Cette obligation d'identification indirecte ne vaut que pour les\n réseaux WLAN gérés à titre professionnel. La personne qui gère\n elle-même son réseau public n'a pas de dispositions particulières à\n prendre et n'est pas tenue d'être en mesure d'identifier qui que ce\n soit, même si elle gère ce réseau par exemple dans le cadre d'un\n festival open-air. Sur ordre des autorités de poursuite pénale et\n après autorisation d'un juge, elle doit simplement fournir les\n données dont elle dispose. Il en va de même pour le propriétaire\n d'un hôtel ou d'un restaurant qui met lui-même son réseau WLAN à la\n disposition de ses clients.\n - Les fournisseurs d'accès à internet de moindre envergure économique\n ou opérant dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la recherche\n peuvent être dispensés de certaines obligations de surveillance. Ces\n fournisseurs d'accès ayant des obligations restreintes en matière de\n surveillance ne sont pas tenus de conserver les données secondaires\n des connexions internet établies via leur réseau WLAN public. Ils ne\n doivent enregistrer que les données saisies au moment de\n l'identification de l'utilisateur et les conserver aussi longtemps\n que le droit d'accès de l'utilisateur est valable et six mois\n au-delà.\n - Pour les utilisateurs eux-mêmes, rien ne change, ils ne seront en\n aucune façon limités dans leurs habitudes de navigation sur\n internet.\n\n- 6. Les particuliers devront-ils à l'avenir enregistrer les données d'identification des membres de leur famille ou de leurs colocataires avec lesquels ils partagent leur connexion WLAN ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les particuliers qui mettent leur accès internet à la disposition\n de tiers ne devront surveiller personne ni enregistrer des données\n pour les livrer à la police ou au ministère public dans le cadre d'une\n enquête. Ils devront néanmoins livrer les données dont ils disposent\n et fournir des renseignements si un ministère public s'adresse au\n Service SCPT pour les obtenir. Ils devront aussi tolérer des\n surveillances ordonnées et autorisées que le Service SCPT serait\n appelé à mener.\n\n- 7. Si j'ouvre l'accès à mon WLAN privé, faut-il que j'enregistre des données des utilisateurs et que je les livre, si on me les demande ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Le particulier qui met son accès internet à la disposition de\n tiers doit uniquement livrer au Service SCPT les données dont il\n pourrait disposer, fournir des renseignements et tolérer une\n surveillance qui serait réalisée par le Service SCPT. Ce dernier ne\n peut mettre en place une surveillance que dans le cadre d'une enquête\n menée par la police et le ministère public pour élucider une\n infraction, et seulement si la surveillance est ordonnée par le\n ministère public et autorisée par le tribunal compétent.\n\n- 8. Qui devra, selon les nouvelles règles, produire une pièce d'identité et à quelle occasion ?\n\n []\n\n À partir du 1er mars 2018, les personnes qui achètent une carte SIM\n devront présenter une pièce d'identité pour que le fournisseur en\n fasse une copie. Si l'acheteur peut s'identifier à l'aide d'un moyen\n d'identification électronique valable (eID) ou d'un service\n d'identification en ligne, il n'a pas besoin de se présenter en\n personne.\n\n Au demeurant, les fournisseurs ont déjà l'obligation d'identifier les\n usagers au moyen d'un document officiel (sans conserver de copie) pour\n l'achat d'une carte SIM à prépaiement. Mais comme certains d'entre eux\n ne s'acquittent pas toujours de cette obligation et enregistrent\n parfois des clients sous des noms fantaisistes (par ex. Superman de\n Krypton), ils devront dorénavant conserver une copie lisible du\n document produit, qu'ils devront transmettre à la police ou au\n ministère public pour les besoins d'une enquête. Cette obligation\n s'appliquera à tous les clients (prépaiement et post-paiement).\n\n Les règles ne changent pas, en revanche, en ce qui concerne les accès\n WLAN : les usagers ne seront pas obligés de présenter de pièce\n d'identité pour s'enregistrer.\n\n- 9. Est-il vrai que les fournisseurs devront enregistrer les données des cartes de crédit de leurs clients ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les fournisseurs ne devront livrer ces informations que si elles\n sont déjà en leur possession. Aujourd'hui déjà, ils ne doivent fournir\n ces données que si la police ou le ministère public en a besoin pour\n élucider une infraction et les y enjoint dans une décision. La\n nouvelle réglementation prévoit une procédure standard qui simplifiera\n le travail des fournisseurs et des autorités.\n\n- 10. Que sont ces \"recherches flexibles\" dont il est question maintenant ?\n\n []\n\n L'introduction de recherches flexibles pour les demandes de\n renseignements, par exemple concernant le détenteur d'un numéro de\n téléphone ou d'une adresse IP, était une demande exprimée avec force\n par les autorités de poursuite pénale lors de la consultation. On\n évite ainsi à un policier de saisir plusieurs fois manuellement un nom\n dans différentes variantes, par exemple Nils/Niels Güggi/Gueggi/Guggi,\n etc. La recherche se fait ainsi automatiquement pour toutes les\n variantes, et les fautes de frappe ou les différences qui peuvent\n survenir lors de la transcription de noms à partir d'autres alphabets\n n'a pas d'incidence sur le résultat de la recherche.\n\n- 11. Les fournisseurs verront-ils leur charge de travail alourdie ou allégée ?\n\n []\n\n Le nouveau droit aura pour conséquence d'alléger grandement les\n obligations de nombreux petits fournisseurs de services de\n télécommunication en Suisse. Le Conseil fédéral a opté à dessein pour\n une protection des PME. La nouvelle ordonnance ne prévoit plus\n d'obligations complètes en matière de surveillance que pour quelques\n dizaines des entreprises du secteur, sur un total d'environ 600, à\n savoir les plus importantes (à partir de 100 millions de chiffre\n d'affaires annuel). Les entreprises plus petites devront simplement\n permettre au Service SCPT, sur ordre d'une autorité de poursuite\n pénale et après autorisation d'un juge, de se procurer les données se\n trouvant dans leurs systèmes, et donc lui donner accès à ces systèmes.\n Ces entreprises de moindre taille n'auront pas d'autres mesures à\n prendre, et pas d'investissements à faire, ce qui allégera leur charge\n par rapport au régime actuel.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "CH", "row_key": "CH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/fr/questions-et-reponses-sur-la-nouvelle-loi-lscpt-et-ses-ordonnances-de-mise-en-uvre", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#CH.CH|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Federal Council set 1 March 2018 as the start date for LSCPT and its implementing ordinances. Police and prosecutors may monitor telecommunications through public WLAN only with judicial authorisation; Service SCPT conducts surveillance only when ordered by a prosecutor and authorised by the competent court.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27a40ed436468a734587189c83804c03f87530cbac910e52a34b98914813a0fd\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"eadf9ab022995e54ddb2950b1370556a1feb762e8be74982555a58d0f8eb1337\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Federal Council set 1 March 2018 as the start date for LSCPT and its implementing ordinances. Police and prosecutors may monitor telecommunications through public WLAN only with judicial authorisation; Service SCPT conducts surveillance only when ordered by a prosecutor and authorised by the competent court.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Publié le 17 novembre 2017\n\nQuestions et réponses sur la nouvelle loi (LSCPT) et ses ordonnances de mise en œuvre\n\nLa nouvelle loi sur la surveillance de la correspondance par poste et\ntélécommunication (LSCPT) et ses ordonnances de mise en œuvre entreront\nen vigueur le 1er mars 2018. Ainsi en a décidé le Conseil fédéral lors\nde sa séance du 15 novembre 2017. Le Parlement avait adopté la loi le 18\nmars 2016. Le référendum qui avait été lancé n'a pas abouti. L'objectif\nde cette loi est de donner à la Suisse des bases légales claires et\nadaptées à l'évolution technologique pour la surveillance des\ntélécommunications et du courrier postal. Les autorités de poursuite\npénale doivent disposer des outils nécessaires pour élucider les\ninfractions commises à l'aide des nouvelles technologies.\n\n- 1. Les nouvelles règles signent-elles l'arrêt de mort des accès WLAN publics ?\n\n []\n\n Non, ces points d'accès publics resteront bien entendu autorisés. Afin\n d'élucider des infractions graves, la police et les ministères publics\n doivent néanmoins pouvoir aussi surveiller, sur autorisation d'un\n juge, les télécommunications transitant par ces points d'accès WLAN.\n Ils doivent avoir la possibilité d'identifier les internautes, lorsque\n les conditions légales d'une enquête sont réunies, comme ils le\n peuvent aujourd'hui déjà pour les usagers d'un raccordement\n téléphonique fixe ou mobile. À défaut, il serait trop facile pour les\n criminels de rester anonymes.\n\n- 2. De quoi est-il question exactement lorsqu'on parle d'identification indirecte ?\n\n []\n\n Pour élucider des infractions, la police et les ministères publics\n doivent aussi pouvoir identifier les utilisateurs d'un accès WLAN\n public, lorsque les conditions légales d'une enquête sont réunies.\n Cela n'est possible que si ces utilisateurs se connectent au réseau\n WLAN en question avec des données d'accès et s'ils se sont au\n préalable identifiés au moins indirectement. Des solutions existent\n déjà, qui sont conviviales pour les utilisateurs et peu coûteuses pour\n les fournisseurs. Elles sont par exemple utilisées dans les gares, les\n cars postaux ou les aéroports, avec une connexion et une\n identification grâce à un code de confirmation envoyé par SMS.\n D'autres méthodes sont envisageables : carte de crédit, carte\n d'embarquement dans un aéroport ou bon de réservation à l'hôtel, avec\n un code lié au numéro de chambre. Les autorités de poursuite pénale\n ont ainsi une chance réaliste de découvrir qui utilise ou a utilisé un\n réseau WLAN pour planifier ou commettre une infraction. Une copie\n d'une pièce d'identité, comme certains médias l'ont évoqué, ne sera\n cependant pas exigée.\n\n- 3. Quelles sont les implications de la solution d'identification indirecte pour la poursuite pénale ?\n\n []\n\n Pour les autorités de poursuite pénale, l'identification indirecte est\n un progrès, car il n'y avait jusqu'à présent aucune obligation de\n s'identifier de quelque manière que ce soit lors de l'utilisation d'un\n réseau WLAN public. Une lacune demeure cependant dans tous les cas où\n l'identification continuera de ne pas être obligatoire. L'obligation\n de s'identifier ne vaut en effet que pour les réseaux WLAN gérés à\n titre professionnel (voir question 5).\n\n- 4. Est-il vrai que les ordonnances ont été durcies suite à la consultation ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les ordonnances n'ont pas été durcies, mais au contraire\n assouplies. De nombreuses demandes des fournisseurs de prestations ont\n été prises en compte : différentes dispositions ont été adaptées, des\n délais ont été prolongés et certaines règles ont été biffées, en\n particulier concernant la question de l'identification des\n utilisateurs d'un réseau WLAN. Il ne s'agit pas ici de surveillance,\n mais uniquement de la possibilité d'identifier un utilisateur donné à\n l'aide de certaines informations (par ex. un numéro de téléphone\n mobile), c'est-à-dire indirectement.\n\n- 5. Sur quels points les dispositions ont-elles été adaptées après la consultation ?\n\n []\n\n Les ordonnances, qui ont également été soumises pour avis aux\n commissions des affaires juridiques du Parlement, ont été adaptées sur\n les points suivants :\n\n - Seuls doivent pouvoir être identifiés les utilisateurs finaux d'un\n réseau WLAN géré à titre professionnel, c'est-à-dire, par exemple,\n le réseau d'une gare ou d'un aéroport. De nombreux fournisseurs\n disposent aujourd'hui déjà de systèmes permettant d'identifier\n rapidement et simplement les utilisateurs, par exemple via un SMS.\n - Cette obligation d'identification indirecte ne vaut que pour les\n réseaux WLAN gérés à titre professionnel. La personne qui gère\n elle-même son réseau public n'a pas de dispositions particulières à\n prendre et n'est pas tenue d'être en mesure d'identifier qui que ce\n soit, même si elle gère ce réseau par exemple dans le cadre d'un\n festival open-air. Sur ordre des autorités de poursuite pénale et\n après autorisation d'un juge, elle doit simplement fournir les\n données dont elle dispose. Il en va de même pour le propriétaire\n d'un hôtel ou d'un restaurant qui met lui-même son réseau WLAN à la\n disposition de ses clients.\n - Les fournisseurs d'accès à internet de moindre envergure économique\n ou opérant dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la recherche\n peuvent être dispensés de certaines obligations de surveillance. Ces\n fournisseurs d'accès ayant des obligations restreintes en matière de\n surveillance ne sont pas tenus de conserver les données secondaires\n des connexions internet établies via leur réseau WLAN public. Ils ne\n doivent enregistrer que les données saisies au moment de\n l'identification de l'utilisateur et les conserver aussi longtemps\n que le droit d'accès de l'utilisateur est valable et six mois\n au-delà.\n - Pour les utilisateurs eux-mêmes, rien ne change, ils ne seront en\n aucune façon limités dans leurs habitudes de navigation sur\n internet.\n\n- 6. Les particuliers devront-ils à l'avenir enregistrer les données d'identification des membres de leur famille ou de leurs colocataires avec lesquels ils partagent leur connexion WLAN ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les particuliers qui mettent leur accès internet à la disposition\n de tiers ne devront surveiller personne ni enregistrer des données\n pour les livrer à la police ou au ministère public dans le cadre d'une\n enquête. Ils devront néanmoins livrer les données dont ils disposent\n et fournir des renseignements si un ministère public s'adresse au\n Service SCPT pour les obtenir. Ils devront aussi tolérer des\n surveillances ordonnées et autorisées que le Service SCPT serait\n appelé à mener.\n\n- 7. Si j'ouvre l'accès à mon WLAN privé, faut-il que j'enregistre des données des utilisateurs et que je les livre, si on me les demande ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Le particulier qui met son accès internet à la disposition de\n tiers doit uniquement livrer au Service SCPT les données dont il\n pourrait disposer, fournir des renseignements et tolérer une\n surveillance qui serait réalisée par le Service SCPT. Ce dernier ne\n peut mettre en place une surveillance que dans le cadre d'une enquête\n menée par la police et le ministère public pour élucider une\n infraction, et seulement si la surveillance est ordonnée par le\n ministère public et autorisée par le tribunal compétent.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "CH", "row_key": "CH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/fr/questions-et-reponses-sur-la-nouvelle-loi-lscpt-et-ses-ordonnances-de-mise-en-uvre", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#CH.CH|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The government-issued e-ID is voluntary and requires a valid Swiss ID card or foreigner's ID card. The holder can see requested data and approve or decline the request; expected uses include subscribing to a mobile plan.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"6515071c50da1a57fd6cf4de619cfedb86f2614f1195e2de9678db21ebbb1b8f\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"eadf9ab022995e54ddb2950b1370556a1feb762e8be74982555a58d0f8eb1337\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The government-issued e-ID is voluntary and requires a valid Swiss ID card or foreigner's ID card. The holder can see requested data and approve or decline the request; expected uses include subscribing to a mobile plan.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "The Electronic Identity (e-ID)\n\nThe e-ID is the digital form of an ID card\n\n- The e-ID is an official proof of identity issued by the government.\n- Using it is voluntary and free of charge.\n- The e-ID is valid in both the digital and physical world.\n\nFor example, the e-ID will make it possible to order an electronic\ndriving licence or to prove a minimum age when purchasing age-restricted\nproducts.\n\n[A person holds a smartphone with e-ID in one hand and the traditional\nID card in the other.]\n\nHow will the e-ID work?\n\n[Page for ordering the e-ID in the swiyu Wallet]\n\nOrder your e-ID\nTo order an e-ID, you need a valid Swiss ID card or foreigner's ID card.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[Scanning a QR code with the swiyu Wallet for age verification]\n\nShow your e-ID\nUse the swiyu Wallet to scan the QR code displayed for verification on a\nwebsite or by a person – for example, when opening a bank account\nonline, during police checks, at the supermarket checkout, or at the\nentrance to a club.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[Page for reviewing the requested data in the swiyu Wallet]\n\nCheck data request\nYou can see which data is being requested and choose to approve or\ndecline the request.\n\nFuture Digital Uses of the e-ID\n\n[Examples of digital documents: customer card, certificate of residence,\ndriving licence, e-ID]\n\nExpected from the introduction of the e-ID onwards, the following will\nbe possible:\n•  Prove of age\n•  Open a bank account\n•  Obtain electronic signatures\n•  Register in the organ and tissue donation register\n•  Subscribe to a mobile plan\n•  Use the nationwide government login\n•  Order an extract from the criminal record\n•  Found a company", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "CH", "row_key": "CH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.eid.admin.ch/en/e-id-e", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#CH.CH|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "A person who self-operates public WLAN as a side service, including a festival organiser or a hotel or restaurant owner, need not be able to identify users and supplies only data already held when lawfully ordered. Those providers of lesser economic size, or in education or research, may be exempted from some surveillance duties; they retain identification data for the access period plus six months but need not retain secondary connection data.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27a40ed436468a734587189c83804c03f87530cbac910e52a34b98914813a0fd\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"eadf9ab022995e54ddb2950b1370556a1feb762e8be74982555a58d0f8eb1337\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"A person who self-operates public WLAN as a side service, including a festival organiser or a hotel or restaurant owner, need not be able to identify users and supplies only data already held when lawfully ordered. Those providers of lesser economic size, or in education or research, may be exempted from some surveillance duties; they retain identification data for the access period plus six months but need not retain secondary connection data.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "- 5. Sur quels points les dispositions ont-elles été adaptées après la consultation ?\n\n []\n\n Les ordonnances, qui ont également été soumises pour avis aux\n commissions des affaires juridiques du Parlement, ont été adaptées sur\n les points suivants :\n\n - Seuls doivent pouvoir être identifiés les utilisateurs finaux d'un\n réseau WLAN géré à titre professionnel, c'est-à-dire, par exemple,\n le réseau d'une gare ou d'un aéroport. De nombreux fournisseurs\n disposent aujourd'hui déjà de systèmes permettant d'identifier\n rapidement et simplement les utilisateurs, par exemple via un SMS.\n - Cette obligation d'identification indirecte ne vaut que pour les\n réseaux WLAN gérés à titre professionnel. La personne qui gère\n elle-même son réseau public n'a pas de dispositions particulières à\n prendre et n'est pas tenue d'être en mesure d'identifier qui que ce\n soit, même si elle gère ce réseau par exemple dans le cadre d'un\n festival open-air. Sur ordre des autorités de poursuite pénale et\n après autorisation d'un juge, elle doit simplement fournir les\n données dont elle dispose. Il en va de même pour le propriétaire\n d'un hôtel ou d'un restaurant qui met lui-même son réseau WLAN à la\n disposition de ses clients.\n - Les fournisseurs d'accès à internet de moindre envergure économique\n ou opérant dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la recherche\n peuvent être dispensés de certaines obligations de surveillance. Ces\n fournisseurs d'accès ayant des obligations restreintes en matière de\n surveillance ne sont pas tenus de conserver les données secondaires\n des connexions internet établies via leur réseau WLAN public. Ils ne\n doivent enregistrer que les données saisies au moment de\n l'identification de l'utilisateur et les conserver aussi longtemps\n que le droit d'accès de l'utilisateur est valable et six mois\n au-delà.\n - Pour les utilisateurs eux-mêmes, rien ne change, ils ne seront en\n aucune façon limités dans leurs habitudes de navigation sur\n internet.\n\n- 6. Les particuliers devront-ils à l'avenir enregistrer les données d'identification des membres de leur famille ou de leurs colocataires avec lesquels ils partagent leur connexion WLAN ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les particuliers qui mettent leur accès internet à la disposition\n de tiers ne devront surveiller personne ni enregistrer des données\n pour les livrer à la police ou au ministère public dans le cadre d'une\n enquête. Ils devront néanmoins livrer les données dont ils disposent\n et fournir des renseignements si un ministère public s'adresse au\n Service SCPT pour les obtenir. Ils devront aussi tolérer des\n surveillances ordonnées et autorisées que le Service SCPT serait\n appelé à mener.\n\n- 7. Si j'ouvre l'accès à mon WLAN privé, faut-il que j'enregistre des données des utilisateurs et que je les livre, si on me les demande ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Le particulier qui met son accès internet à la disposition de\n tiers doit uniquement livrer au Service SCPT les données dont il\n pourrait disposer, fournir des renseignements et tolérer une\n surveillance qui serait réalisée par le Service SCPT. Ce dernier ne\n peut mettre en place une surveillance que dans le cadre d'une enquête\n menée par la police et le ministère public pour élucider une\n infraction, et seulement si la surveillance est ordonnée par le\n ministère public et autorisée par le tribunal compétent.\n\n- 8. Qui devra, selon les nouvelles règles, produire une pièce d'identité et à quelle occasion ?\n\n []\n\n À partir du 1er mars 2018, les personnes qui achètent une carte SIM\n devront présenter une pièce d'identité pour que le fournisseur en\n fasse une copie. Si l'acheteur peut s'identifier à l'aide d'un moyen\n d'identification électronique valable (eID) ou d'un service\n d'identification en ligne, il n'a pas besoin de se présenter en\n personne.\n\n Au demeurant, les fournisseurs ont déjà l'obligation d'identifier les\n usagers au moyen d'un document officiel (sans conserver de copie) pour\n l'achat d'une carte SIM à prépaiement. Mais comme certains d'entre eux\n ne s'acquittent pas toujours de cette obligation et enregistrent\n parfois des clients sous des noms fantaisistes (par ex. Superman de\n Krypton), ils devront dorénavant conserver une copie lisible du\n document produit, qu'ils devront transmettre à la police ou au\n ministère public pour les besoins d'une enquête. Cette obligation\n s'appliquera à tous les clients (prépaiement et post-paiement).\n\n Les règles ne changent pas, en revanche, en ce qui concerne les accès\n WLAN : les usagers ne seront pas obligés de présenter de pièce\n d'identité pour s'enregistrer.\n\n- 9. Est-il vrai que les fournisseurs devront enregistrer les données des cartes de crédit de leurs clients ?\n\n []\n\n Non. Les fournisseurs ne devront livrer ces informations que si elles\n sont déjà en leur possession. Aujourd'hui déjà, ils ne doivent fournir\n ces données que si la police ou le ministère public en a besoin pour\n élucider une infraction et les y enjoint dans une décision. La\n nouvelle réglementation prévoit une procédure standard qui simplifiera\n le travail des fournisseurs et des autorités.\n\n- 10. Que sont ces \"recherches flexibles\" dont il est question maintenant ?\n\n []\n\n L'introduction de recherches flexibles pour les demandes de\n renseignements, par exemple concernant le détenteur d'un numéro de\n téléphone ou d'une adresse IP, était une demande exprimée avec force\n par les autorités de poursuite pénale lors de la consultation. On\n évite ainsi à un policier de saisir plusieurs fois manuellement un nom\n dans différentes variantes, par exemple Nils/Niels Güggi/Gueggi/Guggi,\n etc. La recherche se fait ainsi automatiquement pour toutes les\n variantes, et les fautes de frappe ou les différences qui peuvent\n survenir lors de la transcription de noms à partir d'autres alphabets\n n'a pas d'incidence sur le résultat de la recherche.\n\n- 11. Les fournisseurs verront-ils leur charge de travail alourdie ou allégée ?\n\n []\n\n Le nouveau droit aura pour conséquence d'alléger grandement les\n obligations de nombreux petits fournisseurs de services de\n télécommunication en Suisse. Le Conseil fédéral a opté à dessein pour\n une protection des PME. La nouvelle ordonnance ne prévoit plus\n d'obligations complètes en matière de surveillance que pour quelques\n dizaines des entreprises du secteur, sur un total d'environ 600, à\n savoir les plus importantes (à partir de 100 millions de chiffre\n d'affaires annuel). Les entreprises plus petites devront simplement\n permettre au Service SCPT, sur ordre d'une autorité de poursuite\n pénale et après autorisation d'un juge, de se procurer les données se\n trouvant dans leurs systèmes, et donc lui donner accès à ces systèmes.\n Ces entreprises de moindre taille n'auront pas d'autres mesures à\n prendre, et pas d'investissements à faire, ce qui allégera leur charge\n par rapport au régime actuel.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "CH", "row_key": "CH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/fr/questions-et-reponses-sur-la-nouvelle-loi-lscpt-et-ses-ordonnances-de-mise-en-uvre", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#CH.CH|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Communication platforms and search engines operate under privately defined and enforced rules. The proposed federal act would require very large platforms to explain content removals and account suspensions, provide an internal appeal, and participate in out-of-court dispute settlement; consultation responses are being analysed.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"181a9075cebb3a7b93156fe6ea8e25004875126035ab36e816cd2da7b552e31c\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"eadf9ab022995e54ddb2950b1370556a1feb762e8be74982555a58d0f8eb1337\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Communication platforms and search engines operate under privately defined and enforced rules. The proposed federal act would require very large platforms to explain content removals and account suspensions, provide an internal appeal, and participate in out-of-court dispute settlement; consultation responses are being analysed.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "The Federal Council wants to strengthen the rights of users in the\ndigital space and oblige very large online platforms and search engines\nto be more fair and transparent. A new law is to define core rules for\nservices such as Facebook, X, TikTok or Google.\n\nCommunication platforms and search engines are a new part of the\ncommunication infrastructure. They are operated by a handful of\ninternationally active companies according to their own privately\ndefined and enforced rules. The new Federal Act on Communication\nPlatforms and Search Engines is intended to strengthen users’ rights. To\nprotect users’ freedom of expression and freedom of information,\noperators of very large communication platforms will be required to\nensure greater transparency regarding the removal of content and the\nsuspension of accounts by providing information on such decisions and\ngiving reasons for doing so; they will also have to establish an\ninternal appeals procedure and participate in an out-of-court dispute\nsettlement in the event of conflicts. The preliminary draft also\nincludes transparency requirements regarding the labelling and targeting\nof advertising, as well as requirements on the use of recommender\nsystems. Regular reporting and access to data for civil society\norganisations and research bodies will make it possible to better assess\nand monitor the societal impact of the activities of very large\ncommunication platforms and very large search engines.\n\nThe public consultation ran from 29 October 2025 to 16 February 2026.\nThe numerous responses are currently being analysed by DETEC.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "CH", "row_key": "CH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.bakom.admin.ch/en/digital-intermediaries-and-communication-platforms", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#DE.DE|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "TKG section 172 covers providers of the listed number-based interpersonal, internet-access, or signal-transmission services that assign numbers or connection identifiers or provide associated connections; section 172(3) also covers number-independent interpersonal communications providers when they collect the specified data.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27ac65f368860790bc2d000c763ffe9cb75cb7d794a4b6d59d044da214472e63\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"851e61eb78f20a3797914c810a02d7579f9496f63a424e16821aaae644113fb2\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"TKG section 172 covers providers of the listed number-based interpersonal, internet-access, or signal-transmission services that assign numbers or connection identifiers or provide associated connections; section 172(3) also covers number-independent interpersonal communications providers when they collect the specified data.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "§ 172 Daten für Auskunftsersuchen der Sicherheitsbehörden\n\n(1) Wer nummerngebundene interpersonelle Telekommunikationsdienste, Internetzugangsdienste oder Dienste,\ndie ganz oder überwiegend in der Übertragung von Signalen bestehen, erbringt und dabei Rufnummern\noder andere Anschlusskennungen vergibt oder Telekommunikationsanschlüsse für von anderen vergebene\nRufnummern oder andere Anschlusskennungen bereitstellt, hat für die Auskunftsverfahren nach den §§ 173 und\n174 vor der Freischaltung folgende Daten zu erheben und unverzüglich zu speichern, auch, soweit diese Daten für\nbetriebliche Zwecke nicht erforderlich sind:\n1. die Rufnummern,\n2. andere von ihm vergebene Anschlusskennungen,\n3. den Namen und die Anschrift des Anschlussinhabers,\n4. bei natürlichen Personen deren Geburtsdatum,\n5. bei Festnetzanschlüssen die Anschrift des Anschlusses,\n6. in Fällen, in denen neben einem Mobilfunkanschluss auch ein Mobilfunkendgerät überlassen wird, die\n Gerätenummer dieses Gerätes sowie\n7. das Datum der Vergabe der Rufnummer und, soweit abweichend, das Datum des Vertragsbeginns.\nDas Datum der Beendigung der Zuordnung der Rufnummer und, sofern davon abweichend, das Datum des\nVertragsendes sind bei Bekanntwerden ebenfalls zu speichern. Die Sätze 1 und 2 gelten auch, sofern die Daten\nnicht in Endnutzerverzeichnisse eingetragen werden. Für das Auskunftsverfahren nach § 174 ist die Form der\nDatenspeicherung freigestellt.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "DE", "row_key": "DE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2021/TKG.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#DE.DE|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "TKG section 165 requires anyone providing or participating in telecommunications services to take appropriate technical and other measures protecting telecommunications secrecy and personal data, taking the state of the art into account.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27ac65f368860790bc2d000c763ffe9cb75cb7d794a4b6d59d044da214472e63\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"851e61eb78f20a3797914c810a02d7579f9496f63a424e16821aaae644113fb2\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"TKG section 165 requires anyone providing or participating in telecommunications services to take appropriate technical and other measures protecting telecommunications secrecy and personal data, taking the state of the art into account.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "§ 165 Technische und organisatorische Schutzmaßnahmen\n\n(1) Wer Telekommunikationsdienste erbringt oder daran mitwirkt, hat angemessene technische Vorkehrungen\nund sonstige Maßnahmen zu treffen\n1. zum Schutz des Fernmeldegeheimnisses und\n2. gegen die Verletzung des Schutzes personenbezogener Daten.\nDabei ist der Stand der Technik zu berücksichtigen.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "DE", "row_key": "DE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2021/TKG.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#DE.DE|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The prepaid verification framework permits identification using electronic identity proof under Personalausweis Act section 18, eID Card Act section 12, or Residence Act section 78(5).", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27ac65f368860790bc2d000c763ffe9cb75cb7d794a4b6d59d044da214472e63\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"851e61eb78f20a3797914c810a02d7579f9496f63a424e16821aaae644113fb2\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The prepaid verification framework permits identification using electronic identity proof under Personalausweis Act section 18, eID Card Act section 12, or Residence Act section 78(5).\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Für die Identifizierung anhand eines elektronischen Identitätsnachweises nach § 18 des\nPersonalausweisgesetzes, nach § 12 des eID-Karte-Gesetzes oder nach § 78 Absatz 5 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes gilt\n§ 8 Absatz 2 Satz 5 des Geldwäschegesetzes entsprechend.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "DE", "row_key": "DE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2021/TKG.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#DE.DE|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Operators of public telecommunications networks and providers of publicly available telecommunications services must take appropriate technical, organizational, and other security measures; those measures may include encryption to protect systems against unauthorized access.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27ac65f368860790bc2d000c763ffe9cb75cb7d794a4b6d59d044da214472e63\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"851e61eb78f20a3797914c810a02d7579f9496f63a424e16821aaae644113fb2\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Operators of public telecommunications networks and providers of publicly available telecommunications services must take appropriate technical, organizational, and other security measures; those measures may include encryption to protect systems against unauthorized access.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "(2) Wer ein öffentliches Telekommunikationsnetz betreibt oder öffentlich zugängliche Telekommunikationsdienste\nerbringt, hat bei den hierfür betriebenen Telekommunikations- und Datenverarbeitungssystemen angemessene\ntechnische und organisatorische Vorkehrungen und sonstige Maßnahmen zu treffen\n1. zum Schutz gegen Störungen, die zu erheblichen Beeinträchtigungen von Telekommunikationsnetzen und\n ‑diensten führen, auch, sofern diese Störungen durch äußere Angriffe und Einwirkungen von Katastrophen\n bedingt sein können, und\n2. zur Beherrschung der Risiken für die Sicherheit von Telekommunikationsnetzen und -diensten.\nInsbesondere sind Maßnahmen, einschließlich gegebenenfalls Maßnahmen in Form von Verschlüsselung,\nzu treffen, um Telekommunikations- und Datenverarbeitungssysteme gegen unerlaubte Zugriffe zu sichern", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "DE", "row_key": "DE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2021/TKG.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#DE.DE|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "For a number-independent interpersonal communications provider, TKG section 172(3) applies the immediate-storage duty to the specified service identifier, user name and address, birth date, and assignment or contract date when the provider collects those data.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"27ac65f368860790bc2d000c763ffe9cb75cb7d794a4b6d59d044da214472e63\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"851e61eb78f20a3797914c810a02d7579f9496f63a424e16821aaae644113fb2\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"For a number-independent interpersonal communications provider, TKG section 172(3) applies the immediate-storage duty to the specified service identifier, user name and address, birth date, and assignment or contract date when the provider collects those data.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "(3) Die Verpflichtung zur unverzüglichen Speicherung nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 gilt hinsichtlich der Daten nach\nAbsatz 1 Satz 1 Nummer 1, 3, 4 und 7 entsprechend für denjenigen, der nummernunabhängige interpersonelle\nTelekommunikationsdienste erbringt und dabei Daten nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nummer 1, 3, 4 und 7 erhebt, wobei\nan die Stelle der Daten nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nummer 1 die entsprechenden Kennungen des Dienstes und an die\nStelle des Anschlussinhabers nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nummer 3 der Nutzer des Dienstes tritt.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "DE", "row_key": "DE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2021/TKG.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#EE.EE|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The covered actor is a communications undertaking providing publicly available electronic communications service to an end user or another provider.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b96cf58615a4cb8b759592d9f8dbe2c7d4700755243372306a7cd7a959f525b3\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"23a8026cb8508d807033ecc6cf9c1c3d77f532c8b5faf76f859d3f065b809e3f\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The covered actor is a communications undertaking providing publicly available electronic communications service to an end user or another provider.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "elektroonilise side ettevõtja", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "EE", "row_key": "EE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.riigiteataja.ee/public-api/api/v1/akt/111072026085/blob-html", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#EE.EE|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Electronic Communications Act governs public electronic communications services, including internet access, interpersonal communications, and other mainly signal-transmission services.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b96cf58615a4cb8b759592d9f8dbe2c7d4700755243372306a7cd7a959f525b3\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"23a8026cb8508d807033ecc6cf9c1c3d77f532c8b5faf76f859d3f065b809e3f\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Electronic Communications Act governs public electronic communications services, including internet access, interpersonal communications, and other mainly signal-transmission services.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "on kokkulepitud tingimustel elektroonilise side võrgu kaudu osutatav teenus, milleks on internetiühenduse teenus", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "EE", "row_key": "EE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.riigiteataja.ee/public-api/api/v1/akt/111072026085/blob-html", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#EE.EE|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "A digital document is for proving and verifying identity electronically; Mobile-ID certificates can be tied to a SIM or eSIM under the separate identity-document regime.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"1345805107b70c8273572e12b9feade34fa9638c99b1b14abb451f91c3d2bcd2\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"23a8026cb8508d807033ecc6cf9c1c3d77f532c8b5faf76f859d3f065b809e3f\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"A digital document is for proving and verifying identity electronically; Mobile-ID certificates can be tied to a SIM or eSIM under the separate identity-document regime.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Digitaalseks isiku tõendamiseks ettenähtud dokument", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "EE", "row_key": "EE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.riigiteataja.ee/public-api/api/v1/akt/130062026053/blob-html", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#EE.EE|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Retention extends to failed calls when the relevant data are created or processed, excludes mere call attempts, and excludes message content.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b96cf58615a4cb8b759592d9f8dbe2c7d4700755243372306a7cd7a959f525b3\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"23a8026cb8508d807033ecc6cf9c1c3d77f532c8b5faf76f859d3f065b809e3f\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Retention extends to failed calls when the relevant data are created or processed, excludes mere call attempts, and excludes message content.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Nimetatud andmete säilitamise kohustust ei kohaldata kõnekatsele", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "EE", "row_key": "EE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.riigiteataja.ee/public-api/api/v1/akt/111072026085/blob-html", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#EE.EE|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Providers must keep customer, usage, message-content, form, timing, and transmission-method data confidential; the mandatory retention regime excludes message content.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b96cf58615a4cb8b759592d9f8dbe2c7d4700755243372306a7cd7a959f525b3\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"23a8026cb8508d807033ecc6cf9c1c3d77f532c8b5faf76f859d3f065b809e3f\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Providers must keep customer, usage, message-content, form, timing, and transmission-method data confidential; the mandatory retention regime excludes message content.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Sideettevõtja on kohustatud hoidma saladuses kõiki talle sideteenuse osutamise käigus teatavaks saanud andmeid", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "EE", "row_key": "EE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.riigiteataja.ee/public-api/api/v1/akt/111072026085/blob-html", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#FR.FR|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Cryptology use is free with no formality; declaration or authorization duties fall on suppliers or first importers, and the applicable regime depends on technical functions and the planned commercial operation.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"841125c3ce641f37b570307075f21b00d9d37c35b084c1ac93f7a556256cd204\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"8ef8b23e20b12478344d4f707573782068d11fa42b1938c0613b65fdabe0254d\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Cryptology use is free with no formality; declaration or authorization duties fall on suppliers or first importers, and the applicable regime depends on technical functions and the planned commercial operation.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "L’utilisation d’un moyen de cryptologie est libre. Il n’y a aucune démarche à accomplir.\n\nEn revanche, la fourniture, l’importation, le transfert intracommunautaire et l’exportation d’un moyen de cryptologie sont soumis, sauf exception, à déclaration ou à demande d’autorisation.\n\nA qui s’adresse cette réglementation ?\n\nCes démarches  incombent au fournisseur ou au primo-importateur du moyen de cryptologie et sont à accomplir auprès de l’ANSSI.\nLe régime applicable (déclaration ou demande d’autorisation) dépend des fonctionnalités techniques du moyen et de l’opération commerciale projetée (fourniture, importation…).", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "FR", "row_key": "FR|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://cyber.gouv.fr/reglementation/reglementation-identite-confiance-numerique/controles-reglementaires-cryptographie/controle-moyen-de-cryptologie/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#FR.FR|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "ANSSI identifies Law no. 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 and Decree 2007-663 of 2 May 2007 as the cryptology framework; use is free, while specified supply, import, intra-EU transfer and export operations are regulated.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"841125c3ce641f37b570307075f21b00d9d37c35b084c1ac93f7a556256cd204\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"8ef8b23e20b12478344d4f707573782068d11fa42b1938c0613b65fdabe0254d\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"ANSSI identifies Law no. 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 and Decree 2007-663 of 2 May 2007 as the cryptology framework; use is free, while specified supply, import, intra-EU transfer and export operations are regulated.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "En France, les moyens de cryptologie sont soumis à une règlementation spécifique : (Ouvre une nouvelle fenêtre) Loi n°2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 (LCEN) & (Ouvre une nouvelle fenêtre) Décret 2007-663 du 2 mai 2007\n\nL’utilisation d’un moyen de cryptologie est libre. Il n’y a aucune démarche à accomplir.\n\nEn revanche, la fourniture, l’importation, le transfert intracommunautaire et l’exportation d’un moyen de cryptologie sont soumis, sauf exception, à déclaration ou à demande d’autorisation.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "FR", "row_key": "FR|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://cyber.gouv.fr/reglementation/reglementation-identite-confiance-numerique/controles-reglementaires-cryptographie/controle-moyen-de-cryptologie/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#FR.FR|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "FranceConnect/FranceConnect+ transmit an authorized identity set from identity providers to service providers; the pivot identity includes civil name, given names, sex, birth date, and INSEE-coded birth place and country.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"051a308455b585d0df6a95adc5c435a906fba7373da9e4a6926817adf0fd5645\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"8ef8b23e20b12478344d4f707573782068d11fa42b1938c0613b65fdabe0254d\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"FranceConnect/FranceConnect+ transmit an authorized identity set from identity providers to service providers; the pivot identity includes civil name, given names, sex, birth date, and INSEE-coded birth place and country.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Les données des usagers sont fournies par les fournisseurs d'identité aux fournisseurs de service, via FranceConnect ou FranceConnect+, conformément à l'habilitation obtenue sur datapass.api.gouv.fr, et au choix des données effectué par le fournisseur de service dans le cadre de sa demande.\n\nL'identité pivot permet d'identifier un utilisateur particulier :\n\n- Nom de famille inscrit à l'état civil\n- Prénoms\n- Sexe\n- Date de naissance\n- Code géographique INSEE de la ville de naissance\n- Code géographique INSEE du pays de naissance.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "FR", "row_key": "FR|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://docs.partenaires.franceconnect.gouv.fr/fs/fs-pilotage/fs-projet-donnees-identites/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#FR.FR|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "A person who knows a decryption secret for cryptology potentially used to prepare, facilitate, or commit a crime or offence can be required by specified judicial authorities to provide or implement it; refusal is the conduct criminalized.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"26612b67e54f4afa1987fb3085fd41eec85dd1e5de4d58814224af33bbb4ba34\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"8ef8b23e20b12478344d4f707573782068d11fa42b1938c0613b65fdabe0254d\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"A person who knows a decryption secret for cryptology potentially used to prepare, facilitate, or commit a crime or offence can be required by specified judicial authorities to provide or implement it; refusal is the conduct criminalized.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Il réprime « le fait, pour quiconque ayant connaissance de la convention secrète de déchiffrement d'un moyen de cryptologie susceptible d'avoir été utilisé pour préparer, faciliter ou commettre un crime ou un délit, de refuser de remettre ladite convention aux autorités judiciaires ou de la mettre en œuvre, sur les réquisitions de ces autorités délivrées en application des titres II et III du livre I^(er) du code de procédure pénale ».", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "FR", "row_key": "FR|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://qpc360.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/commentaire-decision-2018-696-qpc", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#FR.FR|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-05", "claim_type": null, "display": "ANSSI states that using cryptology is unrestricted, while supplying, importing, transferring within the EU, or exporting cryptology is generally subject to declaration or authorization; those procedures fall to the supplier or first importer.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":null,\"fresh_fetch_http_status\":200,\"fresh_fetch_sha256\":\"808063c8e9b53b8f1796912863bb3aa32d8f62199960a2a51a0ad1226c542317\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"8ef8b23e20b12478344d4f707573782068d11fa42b1938c0613b65fdabe0254d\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":{\"cell_entry\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/pp-city/rigs/content-production/pp-program-2026-10-03/lanes/02-exposure/x.6.FR/r2/gap-search.json\",\"sha256\":\"e756ad77dbfa474deb7ad928364499789895d5f5e7fed4f978a08a286d771161\"},\"sections_read\":[\"ANSSI cryptology-control page — governing rule and actors\"],\"sections_read_bytes\":[{\"bytes\":885,\"citation\":\"ANSSI cryptology-control page — governing rule and actors\",\"path\":\"captures/fr-anssi-cryptology-rule.txt\",\"section\":\"Le contrôle des opérations relatives aux moyens de cryptologie\",\"sha256\":\"2abcf263daa4aa25a2e2078ad7624348d01a3312d7594244dd4db28a75a52876\"}],\"sections_read_total_bytes\":885,\"snapshot_path\":\"captures/808063c8e9b53b8f1796912863bb3aa32d8f62199960a2a51a0ad1226c542317.html\",\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"ANSSI states that using cryptology is unrestricted, while supplying, importing, transferring within the EU, or exporting cryptology is generally subject to declaration or authorization; those procedures fall to the supplier or first importer.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "En France, les moyens de cryptologie sont soumis à une règlementation spécifique : (Ouvre une nouvelle fenêtre) Loi n°2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 (LCEN) & (Ouvre une nouvelle fenêtre) Décret 2007-663 du 2 mai 2007\nL’utilisation d’un moyen de cryptologie est libre. Il n’y a aucune démarche à accomplir.\nEn revanche, la fourniture, l’importation, le transfert intracommunautaire et l’exportation d’un moyen de cryptologie sont soumis, sauf exception, à déclaration ou à demande d’autorisation.\n\nA qui s’adresse cette réglementation ?\nCes démarches  incombent au fournisseur ou au primo-importateur du moyen de cryptologie et sont à accomplir auprès de l’ANSSI.
Le régime applicable (déclaration ou demande d’autorisation) dépend des fonctionnalités techniques du moyen et de l’opération commerciale projetée (fourniture, importation…).\n", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "FR", "row_key": "FR|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://cyber.gouv.fr/reglementation/reglementation-identite-confiance-numerique/controles-reglementaires-cryptographie/controle-moyen-de-cryptologie/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GB.GB|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Act can apply to service providers outside the UK when their services have specified links to the UK.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"25aab1b5296df1efec414d623c30d7bd70b5219b7fc32d864e9f6b8452fede45\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"b41f2dfbb8dd7b55053241622c3e1056d9e8375be0bcef3428c83fdff8541942\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Act can apply to service providers outside the UK when their services have specified links to the UK.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "The Act applies to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK should they have links to the UK.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GB", "row_key": "GB|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GB.GB|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Under section 121, OFCOM may give a notice relating to a regulated user-to-user or search service when it considers the notice necessary and proportionate.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"a9b494cd6b0aa321a60828441dec139a69f233641f1aa2d0f5ac1f879d3e1a3c\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"b41f2dfbb8dd7b55053241622c3e1056d9e8375be0bcef3428c83fdff8541942\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Under section 121, OFCOM may give a notice relating to a regulated user-to-user or search service when it considers the notice necessary and proportionate.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "If OFCOM consider that it is necessary and proportionate to do so, they may give a notice described in subsection (2), (3) or (4) relating to a regulated user-to-user service or a regulated search service to the provider of the service.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GB", "row_key": "GB|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/section/121", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GB.GB|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The national Digital ID programme was cancelled. GOV.UK One Login and GOV.UK Wallet continue, as does the statutory digital-verification-services framework. Employers must perform prescribed right-to-work checks but are not universally required to use a digital route; from 1 October 2026, an employer choosing a digital verification service must use a qualifying certified service.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"4437009d8c57a0a65d47ea1095b34d29f9996385fe33b74e94b1621585244378\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"b41f2dfbb8dd7b55053241622c3e1056d9e8375be0bcef3428c83fdff8541942\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The national Digital ID programme was cancelled. GOV.UK One Login and GOV.UK Wallet continue, as does the statutory digital-verification-services framework. Employers must perform prescribed right-to-work checks but are not universally required to use a digital route; from 1 October 2026, an employer choosing a digital verification service must use a qualifying certified service.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "The national Digital ID programme, announced in September 2025, has been cancelled. Digital identity policy more broadly has moved to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). The Government Digital Service will continue to deliver the existing GOV.UK One Login and GOV.UK Wallet programmes. Established prior to the announcement of the national Digital ID programme last September, these programmes remain key parts of the government's digital transformation agenda to help people engage more easily with public services. Across the economy, the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes (OfDIA), part of DCMS, continues its work to support the development of a market of trustworthy digital verification services (DVS), including the operation of the statutory framework established under Part 2 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which pre-dated the announcement of the national Digital ID programme. Employers will continue to be required to conduct prescribed right to work checks. However, the Government will not require all right to work checks carried out by employers to be conducted digitally. This does not alter the existing arrangements for people who demonstrate their status through the Home Office’s online service, including eVisa holders. From 1 October 2026, where an employer chooses to use a DVS for a prescribed digital right to work check, it will need to use a service that is certified against the DVS trust framework and the supplementary code for digital right to work checks and appears on the statutory DVS register as such to obtain a statutory excuse.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GB", "row_key": "GB|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-08-28/20945/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GB.GB|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The government states that it supports strong encryption and is not asking messaging services to stop implementing end-to-end encryption, while urging sufficient child-safety measures.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"a117ec29b26ec2ff48d44aec65a6a2176713e4a428269036a93c01fe8fb0f477\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"b41f2dfbb8dd7b55053241622c3e1056d9e8375be0bcef3428c83fdff8541942\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The government states that it supports strong encryption and is not asking messaging services to stop implementing end-to-end encryption, while urging sufficient child-safety measures.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "The UK government supports strong encryption. We are not asking companies to stop the implementation of E2EE across their messaging services.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GB", "row_key": "GB|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/end-to-end-encryption-and-child-safety/end-to-end-encryption-and-child-safety", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GB.GB|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Online instant messaging services are among the services described as within the Act's user-to-user duties.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"25aab1b5296df1efec414d623c30d7bd70b5219b7fc32d864e9f6b8452fede45\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"b41f2dfbb8dd7b55053241622c3e1056d9e8375be0bcef3428c83fdff8541942\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Online instant messaging services are among the services described as within the Act's user-to-user duties.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "including social media services, consumer file cloud storage and sharing sites, video-sharing platforms, online forums, dating services, and online instant messaging services.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GB", "row_key": "GB|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GE.GE|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The statute's authorised-person category covers Commission-registered entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial entities that provide electronic communications networks or services; public-law entities qualify only where legislation expressly authorises them.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"f6bd73d41d1aac2bf719dbbb42fc7efb2dfdcb0bc074177d0a50790567a75dbe\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"50d1aa0890024f3f7b1a5da6b5fb4294e84b9e073b18e87089fcbb569ab9a212\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The statute's authorised-person category covers Commission-registered entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial entities that provide electronic communications networks or services; public-law entities qualify only where legislation expressly authorises them.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "ვ) ავტორიზებული პირი − საქართველოს კომუნიკაციების ეროვნული კომისიის მიერ რეგისტრირებული ნებისმიერი სამეწარმეო პირი, აგრეთვე ნებისმიერი არასამეწარმეო იურიდიული პირი, რომელიც ახორციელებს ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელებით უზრუნველყოფას (ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელის ოპერატორი) ან/და ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო მომსახურების მიწოდებას (ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო მომსახურების მიმწოდებელი). მხოლოდ საქართველოს კანონმდებლობით გათვალისწინებულ შემთხვევაშია შესაძლებელი, საჯარო სამართლის იურიდიული პირი გახდეს ავტორიზებული პირი მისთვის საქართველოს კანონმდებლობით პირდაპირ განსაზღვრული უფლებამოსილების განსახორციელებლად;", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GE", "row_key": "GE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GE.GE|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Electronic Communications Law supplies Georgia's national legal and economic framework, regulatory principles, Commission functions, and the rights and duties of persons owning, using, or providing electronic communications networks and services.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"f6bd73d41d1aac2bf719dbbb42fc7efb2dfdcb0bc074177d0a50790567a75dbe\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"50d1aa0890024f3f7b1a5da6b5fb4294e84b9e073b18e87089fcbb569ab9a212\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Electronic Communications Law supplies Georgia's national legal and economic framework, regulatory principles, Commission functions, and the rights and duties of persons owning, using, or providing electronic communications networks and services.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "მუხლი 1. კანონის გამოყენების სფერო  \n\nეს კანონი ადგენს საქართველოს ტერიტორიაზე ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელებითა და საშუალებებით საქმიანობის სამართლებრივ და ეკონომიკურ საფუძვლებს, ამ სფეროში კონკურენტული გარემოს ჩამოყალიბებისა და რეგულირების პრინციპებს, ეროვნული მარეგულირებელი ორგანოს (საქართველოს კომუნიკაციების ეროვნული კომისიის) ფუნქციებს, ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელებისა და საშუალებების ფლობის, გამოყენებისა და მომსახურების მიწოდების დროს ფიზიკურ და იურიდიულ პირთა უფლებებსა და მოვალეობებს.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GE", "row_key": "GE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GE.GE|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The electronic identity card is the primary citizenship/identity document and can provide online authentication and qualified electronic signature. It carries core identity fields and certificates/keys/PINs, omits the holder's address, and permits additional information only within legal limits and with consent.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"812b08b592257de217d611bf4e5a4da4d1b7dab33ea12776a6d30d6babafb244\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"50d1aa0890024f3f7b1a5da6b5fb4294e84b9e073b18e87089fcbb569ab9a212\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The electronic identity card is the primary citizenship/identity document and can provide online authentication and qualified electronic signature. It carries core identity fields and certificates/keys/PINs, omits the holder's address, and permits additional information only within legal limits and with consent.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Electronic identity card is a primary document proving citizenship and identity of a person.\n\nElectronic identity card is a secure, reliable and high-technology document protected against fraud.  \n\nThe electronic carrier of the card also provides online authentication and electronic signature that may be used at the discretion of the holder. Namely, the electronic identity card enables signing a document with a qualified electronic signature.    \n\nElectronic identity card complies with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations and may be used for its intended purpose on the territory of the country and outside the country as well as a travel document.       \n\nCurrently the electronic identity card holders may travel to Turkey, Armenia and Ukraine. \n\nObtaining of Georgian identity card \n\nA Georgian citizen having reached 14 years of age  is obliged to obtain an identity card within the term of 6 months. Identity card may also be issued to a Georgian citizen under the age of 14. The obligation does not apply to Georgian citizens residing abroad.   \n\nAn application for an electronic identity card may be filed at the territorial office of the Public Service Development Agency, Public Service Hall or remotely, through the  Distance Service Unit of the Agency.   If issuance of a document and registration at an address is provided at the same time, an application may be filed at the territorial office of the Agency or the Public Service Hall branch according to the residential address.\n\n \n\nNews and information about the electronic identity card is available on the web page: www.id.ge. Additional functions of the electronic identity card may also be realized via the web page.   \n\nDocuments required for obtaining of the identity card\n\nA citizen applying for the identity card for the first time shall submit:\n\n- Birth certificate;\n- Two photos (photos may be taken at the Public Service Hall, or the territorial office of the Public Service Development Agency, price – GEL 5);\n- If issuance of the electronic identity card and registration of a person at a residential address is requested, the interested person shall submit one of the following documents required for registration of the person at an address:\n- Consent of the apartment owner expressed before the authorized employee accepting the application;\n- A document proving ownership;\n- Written confirmation of two persons of full legal age and capacity that the document holder has been living at a specific address for the last three months expressed before the authorized employee accepting the application.   \n\nChanging of the identity card \n\nGrounds for changing of the identity card   \n\nA person shall be obliged to change the identity card in the following cases:\n\na) When changing a residential address, except the case when a person holds an electronic identity card;   \n\nb) Expiration of the term of validity;\n\nc) Change of first name or surname;\n\nd) If inaccuracy is identified in the record;\n\ne) If the document is unusable (worn out, damaged) or lost. \n\nDocuments to be submitted for issuing the identity card:\n\n- Two photos (photos may be taken at the Public Service Hall, or  the territorial office of the Public Service Development Agency, price – GEL 5);\n- The identity card to be changed (except the loss of the document);\n- In case of change of personal data, a document proving the aforementioned (change of first name/surname etc.).\n\nExemptions\n\nThe following persons shall be exempted from payment of the identity card fee: \n\n- Members of a socially vulnerable family – fully, the rating score does not exceed 70 001;    \n- Participants of the World War II – fully; \n- Georgian citizens who became disabled as a result of military actions conducted for the territorial integrity of Georgia – fully; \n- Persons to whom Georgian citizenship was granted at the discretion of the President of Georgia – fully;  \n- Students studying at authorized higher education institutions whose status can be verified in the database of the Agency shall be released from payment of the relevant service fee by GEL 10 when obtaining the electronic identity card for the first time with the aforementioned status, by GEL 6 – when obtaining the electronic identity card for the second and each subsequent time, and fully – from the photo fee;      \n- Students when obtaining the electronic identity card for the second and each subsequent time with the student data – by 10%; \n- Persons to whom the identity card may be issued with the status of a person with severe or significant disabilities shall be released from the service fee by 50%.     \n\nTerms and fees  \n\n- On the 10^(th) working day – GEL 60; \n- On the 5^(th) working day – GEL 80;\n- On the 3^(rd) working day – GEL 100;\n- On the 2^(nd) working day – GEL 120;\n- On the same day – GEL 150. \n\nElectronic functions of the identity card \n\nAn electronic identity card contains the same electronic data of the holder as are displayed on it visually – given name, surname, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, sex, personal number, photo, signature of the holder, name of the issuing authority, date of issue and date of expiry of the card. The card does not contain the address of the card holder either electronically or visually. The data are entered in compliance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations which significantly simplifies the process of verification of authenticity of the electronic identity card.\n\nThe card also contains the data requisite for online authentication and electronic signature – certificates, keys and codes protecting from unauthorized access (PIN codes).   \n\nThe legislation of Georgia strictly provides provisions for the procedure of entry of additional information about the person into the electronic identity card – the aforementioned shall be implemented only within the predetermined limits and only with the consent of the person.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GE", "row_key": "GE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://sda.gov.ge/en/products/id-card/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GE.GE|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Confidentiality duties yield for specified covert investigative and counter-intelligence measures and database copying; companies must provide identification data to investigative bodies under Criminal Procedure Code Article 136.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"f6bd73d41d1aac2bf719dbbb42fc7efb2dfdcb0bc074177d0a50790567a75dbe\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"50d1aa0890024f3f7b1a5da6b5fb4294e84b9e073b18e87089fcbb569ab9a212\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Confidentiality duties yield for specified covert investigative and counter-intelligence measures and database copying; companies must provide identification data to investigative bodies under Criminal Procedure Code Article 136.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "3. ინფორმაციის საიდუმლოების დაცვის ამ მუხლის მე-2 პუნქტით გათვალისწინებული ვალდებულება არ ვრცელდება იმ შემთხვევებზე, როდესაც უფლებამოსილი ორგანო ატარებს საქართველოს სისხლის სამართლის საპროცესო კოდექსის 143 ¹ მუხლის პირველი ნაწილის „ა“–„გ“ ქვეპუნქტებით გათვალისწინებულ ფარულ საგამოძიებო მოქმედებებს, ახორციელებს „კონტრდაზვერვითი საქმიანობის შესახებ“ საქართველოს კანონის მე-9 მუხლის მე-3 პუნქტით გათვალისწინებულ ელექტრონული თვალთვალის ღონისძიებებს და ამ კანონის 8 ³ მუხლით განსაზღვრულ ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის მაიდენტიფიცირებელ მონაცემთა ბაზების კოპირებას.\n\n4. ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის კომპანია ვალდებულია საგამოძიებო ან ოპერატიულ-სამძებრო საქმიანობის განმახორციელებელ ორგანოს გადასცეს ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის მაიდენტიფიცირებელი მონაცემები საქართველოს სისხლის სამართლის საპროცესო კოდექსის 136-ე მუხლით დადგენილი წესით.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GE", "row_key": "GE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#GE.GE|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "User information and information transmitted over electronic communications networks are confidential. Communication content must be destroyed immediately and automatically after transmission, subject to the law's specified lawful-access channel.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"f6bd73d41d1aac2bf719dbbb42fc7efb2dfdcb0bc074177d0a50790567a75dbe\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"50d1aa0890024f3f7b1a5da6b5fb4294e84b9e073b18e87089fcbb569ab9a212\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"User information and information transmitted over electronic communications networks are confidential. Communication content must be destroyed immediately and automatically after transmission, subject to the law's specified lawful-access channel.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "მუხლი 8. ინფორმაციის საიდუმლოების დაცვა ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციების სფეროში\n\n1. ინფორმაცია ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელების მომხმარებლის შესახებ, აგრეთვე აღნიშნული ქსელების მეშვეობით მომხმარებლის მიერ გადაცემული ინფორმაცია საიდუმლოა და მისი დაცვა გარანტირებულია საქართველოს კანონმდებლობით.\n\n2. ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციების სფეროში დასაქმებული ყველა სუბიექტი ვალდებულია დაიცვას ამ მუხლის პირველ პუნქტში აღნიშნული ინფორმაციის საიდუმლოება. ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციების სფეროს მუშაკები და სხვა პირები, რომლებიც დაარღვევენ ამ ინფორმაციის საიდუმლოებას, პასუხს აგებენ საქართველოს კანონმდებლობის შესაბამისად.\n\n3. ინფორმაციის საიდუმლოების დაცვის ამ მუხლის მე-2 პუნქტით გათვალისწინებული ვალდებულება არ ვრცელდება იმ შემთხვევებზე, როდესაც უფლებამოსილი ორგანო ატარებს საქართველოს სისხლის სამართლის საპროცესო კოდექსის 143 ¹ მუხლის პირველი ნაწილის „ა“–„გ“ ქვეპუნქტებით გათვალისწინებულ ფარულ საგამოძიებო მოქმედებებს, ახორციელებს „კონტრდაზვერვითი საქმიანობის შესახებ“ საქართველოს კანონის მე-9 მუხლის მე-3 პუნქტით გათვალისწინებულ ელექტრონული თვალთვალის ღონისძიებებს და ამ კანონის 8 ³ მუხლით განსაზღვრულ ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის მაიდენტიფიცირებელ მონაცემთა ბაზების კოპირებას.\n\n4. ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის კომპანია ვალდებულია საგამოძიებო ან ოპერატიულ-სამძებრო საქმიანობის განმახორციელებელ ორგანოს გადასცეს ელექტრონული კომუნიკაციის მაიდენტიფიცირებელი მონაცემები საქართველოს სისხლის სამართლის საპროცესო კოდექსის 136-ე მუხლით დადგენილი წესით.\n\n5. ელექტრონული საკომუნიკაციო ქსელის მეშვეობით მომხმარებლის მიერ განხორციელებული კომუნიკაციის შინაარსის შესახებ ინფორმაცია მისი გადაცემისთანავე, დაუყოვნებლივ, ავტომატურად უნდა განადგურდეს. აღნიშნული ინფორმაცია კანონით დადგენილი წესით ხელმისაწვდომი შეიძლება გახდეს მხოლოდ ამ კანონის 8 ¹ მუხლით გათვალისწინებული სუბიექტისათვის.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "GE", "row_key": "GE|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PT.PT|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The captured contract-information duty binds companies offering publicly available electronic communications services, except transmission services used for machine-to-machine services, and requires information to be given to consumers before contract formation.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"a40b3f549b1f83f656694b9672372c8bc7b460cc9ff475a2401a798b800a3506\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"85aa217d24f6c7d051bd11b28f486814aa5c6fef07c1caa616bf834c4bfcc4bc\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/PT/er-fetch/PT/e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90.pdf\",\"sha256\":\"e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The captured contract-information duty binds companies offering publicly available electronic communications services, except transmission services used for machine-to-machine services, and requires information to be given to consumers before contract formation.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "1 — As empresas que oferecem serviços de comunicações eletrónicas acessíveis ao público, \ncom exceção dos serviços de transmissão utilizados para a prestação de serviços máquina a \nmáquina, devem, previamente à celebração de um contrato, disponibilizar ao consumidor as infor-\nmações referidas no artigo 4.º do Decreto -Lei n.º 24/2014, de 14 de fevereiro, e no artigo 8.º da Lei \nn.º 24/96, de 31 de julho, consoante estejam, ou não, em causa contratos celebrados à distância \nou fora do estabelecimento comercial.\n2 — As empresas que oferecem serviços de comunicações eletrónicas acessíveis ao público, ", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PT", "row_key": "PT|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PT.PT|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The annexed Electronic Communications Law defines the national regulatory authority as ANACOM and identifies its statutes as Decree-Law 39/2015.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"a40b3f549b1f83f656694b9672372c8bc7b460cc9ff475a2401a798b800a3506\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"85aa217d24f6c7d051bd11b28f486814aa5c6fef07c1caa616bf834c4bfcc4bc\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/PT/er-fetch/PT/e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90.pdf\",\"sha256\":\"e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The annexed Electronic Communications Law defines the national regulatory authority as ANACOM and identifies its statutes as Decree-Law 39/2015.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "c) «ARN», a Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações (ANACOM), cujos estatutos foram apro-\nvados pelo Decreto -Lei n.º 39/2015, de 16 de março (Estatutos da ANACOM);\nd) «Autoridades competentes ou outras autoridades competentes», as entidades às quais \nsejam especificamente conferidas competências previstas na presente lei, para além da ARN;", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PT", "row_key": "PT|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PT.PT|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Chave Móvel Digital is an alternative, voluntary means for electronic authentication and qualified electronic signature; a citizen may associate a civil-identification number with one mobile number and may also associate an email address.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"4fbc081f8ec8243db9341f1afcf89a37c54adb9d957c33b831ab78e0b43163bd\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"85aa217d24f6c7d051bd11b28f486814aa5c6fef07c1caa616bf834c4bfcc4bc\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/PT/er-fetch/PT/155d2e494e85437b6951a114ee7b607ca43aa7cc2809527b6d509df6116868b5.pdf\",\"sha256\":\"155d2e494e85437b6951a114ee7b607ca43aa7cc2809527b6d509df6116868b5\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Chave Móvel Digital is an alternative, voluntary means for electronic authentication and qualified electronic signature; a citizen may associate a civil-identification number with one mobile number and may also associate an email address.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "O presente decreto -lei procede à quarta alteração à Lei n.º 37/2014, de 26 de junho, alterada \npelas Leis n.º 32/2017, de 1 de junho, 71/2018, de 31 de dezembro, e 2/2020, de 31 de março, que \nestabelece um sistema alternativo e voluntário de autenticação dos cidadãos nos portais e sítios \nna Internet denominado Chave Móvel Digital.\nArtigo 2.º\nAlteração à Lei n.º 37/2014, de 26 de junho\nOs artigos 1.º a 4.º da Lei n.º 37/2014, de 26 de junho, na sua redação atual, passam a ter a \nseguinte redação:\n«Artigo 1.º\n[...]\nA presente lei cria a «Chave Móvel Digital» (CMD) como meio alternativo e voluntário:\na) De autenticação dos cidadãos em sistemas eletrónicos e sítios na Internet;\nb) De assinatura eletrónica qualificada, nos termos previstos no Regulamento (UE) n.º 910/2014, \ndo Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 23 de julho de 2014, e do Decreto -Lei n.º 12/2021, de \n9 de fevereiro.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PT", "row_key": "PT|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0000600014.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PT.PT|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Private networks of the Ministry of National Defence and security or emergency forces and services are governed by specific legislation; the law also preserves measures for public security and order, criminal investigation, and defence.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": 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\nforças e serviços de segurança e de emergência, as quais se regem por legislação específica;\nd) A rede informática do Governo, gerida pelo Centro de Gestão da Rede Informática do \nGoverno, bem como as redes criadas para prosseguir os fins previstos na alínea g) do n.º 2 do \nartigo 2.º do Decreto -Lei n.º 16/2012, de 26 de janeiro.\n2 — O disposto na presente lei não prejudica:\na) O regime da disponibilização no mercado, da colocação em serviço e da utilização de equi-\npamentos de rádio, aprovado pelo Decreto -Lei n.º 57/2017, de 9 de junho;\nb) O regime aplicável à construção de infraestruturas aptas ao alojamento de redes de comunica-\nções eletrónicas, à instalação de redes de comunicações eletrónicas e à construção de infraestruturas \nde telecomunicações em loteamentos, urbanizações, edifícios e conjuntos de edifícios, previsto no \nDecreto -Lei n.º 123/2009, de 21 de maio;\nc) O regime aplicável à utilização do espectro de radiofrequências, incluindo as condições \nrelativas às redes e estações de radiocomunicações, previsto no Decreto -Lei n.º 151 -A/2000, de \n20 de julho, em tudo o que não for especialmente previsto na presente lei;\nd) O regime jurídico aplicável aos radioamadores, previsto no Decreto -Lei n.º 53/2009, de \n2 de março;\ne) O regime jurídico aplicável aos serviços públicos essenciais, previsto na Lei n.º 23/96, de \n26 de julho;\nf) O regime jurídico aplicável à prestação de serviços de promoção, informação e apoio aos \nconsumidores e utentes através de centros telefónicos de relacionamento (call centers), aprovado \npelo Decreto -Lei n.º 134/2009, de 2 de junho;\nN.º 157 16 de agosto de 2022 Pág. 14\nDiário da República, 1.ª série\n3 — Em caso de conflito entre normas da presente lei e as normas estabelecidas na restante \nlegislação setorial aplicável prevalecem as normas da presente lei, salvo quando de outra disposição \nresulte um regime mais exigente para as empresas que oferecem redes e serviços de comunicações \neletrónicas, caso em que se aplica o regime mais exigente.\n4 — O disposto na presente lei não prejudica a aplicação das medidas adotadas a nível da \nUnião Europeia ou nacional, com vista:\na) Ao cumprimento das obrigações impostas no que respeita aos serviços oferecidos através \nde redes e serviços de comunicações eletrónicas;\nb) A prosseguir objetivos de interesse geral, em especial relacionados com a regulamentação \nde conteúdos, a política audiovisual e a proteção de dados pessoais e da privacidade;\nc) A preservar a segurança e a ordem pública, a permitir a investigação, deteção e repressão \nde atos criminosos e a garantir a defesa.\nArtigo 3.º\nDefinições\n1 — Para os efeitos do disposto na presente lei, entende -se por:", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PT", "row_key": "PT|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PT.PT|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Providers of number-based interpersonal communications that support value-added SMS or MMS must provide free blocking for services that send repeated or continuing messages or erotic or sexual content. Access may be activated generally or selectively only after the end user requests it in writing or through another durable medium available to that user.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"a40b3f549b1f83f656694b9672372c8bc7b460cc9ff475a2401a798b800a3506\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"85aa217d24f6c7d051bd11b28f486814aa5c6fef07c1caa616bf834c4bfcc4bc\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/PT/er-fetch/PT/e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90.pdf\",\"sha256\":\"e654441aa21a7bf09519be97bee441a9b83aae0493a1052631588d82f9c8db90\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Providers of number-based interpersonal communications that support value-added SMS or MMS must provide free blocking for services that send repeated or continuing messages or erotic or sexual content. Access may be activated generally or selectively only after the end user requests it in writing or through another durable medium available to that user.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "2 — As empresas que oferecem serviços de comunicações interpessoais com base em números \nque sirvam de suporte à prestação de serviços de valor acrescentado baseados no envio de men-\nsagem, incluindo SMS ou MMS (multimedia messaging service), devem garantir que se encontre \nbarrado, sem quaisquer encargos, o acesso a serviços:\na) Que impliquem o envio de mais de uma mensagem ou o envio de mensagens de forma \nperiódica ou continuada; ou\nb) Com conteúdo erótico ou sexual.\n3 — O acesso aos serviços referidos no número anterior só pode ser ativado, genérica ou \nseletivamente, após pedido efetuado pelo utilizador final por escrito ou através de outro suporte \ndurável à sua disposição.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PT", "row_key": "PT|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PY.PY|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The captured framework addresses service operators holding concessions, licences, or authorisations and also applies specified secrecy protections to telecommunications personnel and users.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b5632c4f8ce06d771dad4164bcf4d39736e84c596d8e91e33e636a9b91886f66\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"5f50fc2acc59cd8a8ef2a1f05697fad31617b739f770c21238605d15cc4b6a59\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The captured framework addresses service operators holding concessions, licences, or authorisations and also applies specified secrecy protections to telecommunications personnel and users.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "concesiones, licencias y autorizaciones", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PY", "row_key": "PY|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PY.PY|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Law 642 classifies telecommunications services and assigns regulatory, licensing, control, and sanction functions to CONATEL.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b5632c4f8ce06d771dad4164bcf4d39736e84c596d8e91e33e636a9b91886f66\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"5f50fc2acc59cd8a8ef2a1f05697fad31617b739f770c21238605d15cc4b6a59\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Law 642 classifies telecommunications services and assigns regulatory, licensing, control, and sanction functions to CONATEL.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Las telecomunicaciones en !a Repüblica del Paraguay se clasifican", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PY", "row_key": "PY|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PY.PY|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "MITIC states that Identidad Electrónica will add mandatory SMS two-factor verification for access to principal state digital platforms; the announcement describes the change as forthcoming, not as an already-completed rollout.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"384e8c2310233e8ef51c8a31d2f9b7833ffcd027c9d6deb8c36d69b974d57178\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"5f50fc2acc59cd8a8ef2a1f05697fad31617b739f770c21238605d15cc4b6a59\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"MITIC states that Identidad Electrónica will add mandatory SMS two-factor verification for access to principal state digital platforms; the announcement describes the change as forthcoming, not as an already-completed rollout.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "además de la contraseña, los usuarios recibirán un código en su teléfono celular", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PY", "row_key": "PY|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://mitic.gov.py/autenticacion-en-dos-pasos-via-sms-sera-obligatorio-para-uso-de-identidad-electronica/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PY.PY|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The secrecy protection for communications and related information is subject to an express judicial-order exception.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b5632c4f8ce06d771dad4164bcf4d39736e84c596d8e91e33e636a9b91886f66\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"5f50fc2acc59cd8a8ef2a1f05697fad31617b739f770c21238605d15cc4b6a59\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The secrecy protection for communications and related information is subject to an express judicial-order exception.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "orden judicial. Esta", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PY", "row_key": "PY|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#PY.PY|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Law 642 protects the secrecy and inviolability of telecommunications correspondence, subject to a judicial-order exception; the captured law does not make messaging use conditional on a separate identity enrollment.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"b5632c4f8ce06d771dad4164bcf4d39736e84c596d8e91e33e636a9b91886f66\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"5f50fc2acc59cd8a8ef2a1f05697fad31617b739f770c21238605d15cc4b6a59\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Law 642 protects the secrecy and inviolability of telecommunications correspondence, subject to a judicial-order exception; the captured law does not make messaging use conditional on a separate identity enrollment.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "por los servicios de telecomunicaciones", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "PY", "row_key": "PY|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#SG.SG|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Online Criminal Harms Act defines an online service provider as the provider of an online service and defines an online service as a service through which online activity can be conducted by internet access.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"2abc8af0b07c2de34b684854adcf6e3443fb7b0eee4ea1dec50474affb857d3d\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4492b8553f9901bf8900aa08e958871b26f3fb19555a79a4b4ebe33df6707782\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Online Criminal Harms Act defines an online service provider as the provider of an online service and defines an online service as a service through which online activity can be conducted by internet access.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "notice, an implementation directive or a Part 6 order, in relation to that online service or any online activity, online material, online account, app, online service or online location that can be accessed on or through that online service; “offence group” means the offences specified in a Part of the Second Schedule; “online account” means an account on an online service; “online activity” means any activity conducted by means of the internet, and regulations may clarify the types of activities that are online activities; “online location” means any internet domain, website, webpage, chatroom, channel, group, forum or any other location, that can be accessed by means of the internet; “online material” means material (including any computer program, machine code and internet link) that can be accessed at an online location by means of the internet; “online service” means the whole or any part of any service on or through which online activity can be conducted and which can be accessed by means of the internet, and regulations may clarify the types of services that are online services; “online service provider” means the provider of an online service; “originator”, in relation to relevant material, means the person who posted the relevant material, and excludes any other person who reposts identical copies of the relevant material so posted; “owner”, for an app that is distributed or available for download by means of an app distribution service, means a person that caused the app to be distributed or available for download by means of the app distribution service; “Part 2 direction” means any of the following directions: ( a ) an access blocking direction; ( b ) an account restriction direction; ( c ) an app removal direction; ( d ) a disabling direction; ( e ) a stop communication direction; “Part 6 order” means any of the following orders: ( a ) an access blocking order; ( b ) an app removal order; ( c ) a service restriction order; “partnership” includes a limited partnership but not a limited liability partnership; “person” includes an individual and an entity; “proprietor” — ( a ) for an online location, means a person who — (i) develops and maintains the online location; (ii) organises, manages or supervises the use of the online location; (iii) manages or regulates membership of, or access to, the online location; or (iv) has the authority to decide whether any material may be included or excluded on the online location, or where to place the material on the online location or otherwise exercise editorial control over the online location; and ( b ) for an online account, means a person who has control of the account; “public authority” means a body established or constituted by or under a public Act to perform or", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "SG", "row_key": "SG|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/OCHA2023?WholeDoc=1", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#SG.SG|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Telecommunications Act 1999 includes statutory powers to license telecommunication systems and services and to issue telecommunications codes, performance standards, and directions.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"d466a12ed57229362486ef83669cb8fb03861d0a0ebb9f6eb1741f486c28abc7\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4492b8553f9901bf8900aa08e958871b26f3fb19555a79a4b4ebe33df6707782\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Telecommunications Act 1999 includes 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MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF TELECOMMUNICATION INSTALLATIONS 15 Power to enter on and examine land other than State land 16 Power to enter on State land for purposes of installation or plant 17 Power to enter on other land or building for purposes of installation or plant 18 Transfer of installation or plant 19 Saving of wayleave agreements 20 Inspection, maintenance and repair of installation or plant for telecommunications 21 Alteration or relocation of public telecommunication licensee’s installation or plant 22 Removal of trees dangerous to or obstructing any installation or plant for telecommunications 23 Provision of space or facility under code of practice 24 Provision of facilities for radio-communication 25 Provision of space or facility or installation, plant or system by direction of Authority 26 Prohibition against exclusive agreements or arrangements 27 Disputes as to compensation 28 Precautions in execution of work 29 Exemption from distress and attachment, etc. Part 4 CODES 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Secure and convenient access to over 2,700 services across 800 government agencies and businesses.", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "SG", "row_key": "SG|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.tech.gov.sg/products-and-services/for-citizens/digital-services/singpass/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#SG.SG|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-05", "claim_type": null, "display": "Recipients of an OCHA direction, affected proprietors, and originators may seek reconsideration; an unsuccessful applicant may appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":null,\"fresh_fetch_http_status\":200,\"fresh_fetch_sha256\":\"eee388e7f5265693128ed269b8c8b1f80231809a1b678120bed2c588716d7994\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4492b8553f9901bf8900aa08e958871b26f3fb19555a79a4b4ebe33df6707782\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":{\"cell_entry\":null,\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/pp-city/rigs/content-production/pp-program-2026-10-03/lanes/02-exposure/x.6.SG/r5/searches/comms-whole-exceptions.json\",\"sha256\":\"22190e98d116f9c376eefa4e6756d06fca37e5892db251ac188e270e763df7a2\"},\"sections_read\":[\"MHA OCHA commencement guidance — appeal framework\"],\"sections_read_bytes\":[{\"bytes\":560,\"citation\":\"MHA OCHA commencement guidance — appeal framework\",\"path\":\"captures/sg-ocha-appeals.txt\",\"section\":\"Appeal Framework\",\"sha256\":\"59655ffcd9f0bc6bdcb846ef57a5f6cc40ec7629fa2322ec006dcb9043bae3ce\"}],\"sections_read_total_bytes\":560,\"snapshot_path\":\"captures/eee388e7f5265693128ed269b8c8b1f80231809a1b678120bed2c588716d7994.html\",\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Recipients of an OCHA direction, affected proprietors, and originators may seek reconsideration; an unsuccessful applicant may appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "
Appeal Framework\n10. Recipients of a direction, the proprietor of the online location and the originator of the material targeted by the direction may apply to a Designated Officer for  reconsideration. For orders, the reconsideration of the Competent Authority may be sought.\n11. Should the application for reconsideration be unsuccessful, the appellant can appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal for the direction or order to be cancelled. The Reviewing Tribunal comprises a District Judge or Magistrate appointed by the President, on the advice of the Cabinet.\n", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "SG", "row_key": "SG|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/commencement-of-the-online-criminal-harms-act-ocha-on-1-february-2024/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#SG.SG|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-05", "claim_type": null, "display": "For suspected specified offences, OCHA directions can require specified online content to stop, disable content, restrict accounts, block access, or remove apps; the initial focus is scams and egregious online activity.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":null,\"fresh_fetch_http_status\":200,\"fresh_fetch_sha256\":\"eee388e7f5265693128ed269b8c8b1f80231809a1b678120bed2c588716d7994\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"4492b8553f9901bf8900aa08e958871b26f3fb19555a79a4b4ebe33df6707782\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":null,\"search_record\":{\"cell_entry\":null,\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/pp-city/rigs/content-production/pp-program-2026-10-03/lanes/02-exposure/x.6.SG/r5/searches/comms-whole-messaging_rule.json\",\"sha256\":\"357d19ff7a725fdbc322d0fdaca4289482608eeead10db89d79f0ea03a96e1b7\"},\"sections_read\":[\"MHA OCHA commencement guidance — directions\"],\"sections_read_bytes\":[{\"bytes\":2277,\"citation\":\"MHA OCHA commencement guidance — directions\",\"path\":\"captures/sg-ocha-directions.txt\",\"section\":\"Directions\",\"sha256\":\"a2e2be17173729291b57143b3f2e80e2132115c5a33db703663e30a4ca9341ca\"}],\"sections_read_total_bytes\":2277,\"snapshot_path\":\"captures/eee388e7f5265693128ed269b8c8b1f80231809a1b678120bed2c588716d7994.html\",\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"For suspected specified offences, OCHA directions can require specified online content to stop, disable content, restrict accounts, block access, or remove apps; the initial focus is scams and egregious online activity.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "4. Designated Officers can issue directions to any online service provider, entity, or individual, when there is reasonable suspicion that an online activity is in furtherance of the commission of a specified offence. [1]\n5. For scams and malicious cyber activities, the threshold for issuing directions is lower. Directions can be issued when there is suspicion or reason to believe that any online activity is being carried out in preparation for or in furtherance of the commission of a scam or malicious cyber activity offence. This will enable the Government to proactively disrupt scams and malicious cyber activities before the public falls prey. [2]\n6. Depending on the facts of the case, the following directions may be issued:\n(a) Stop Communication Direction . This requires the recipient of the direction to stop communicating specified online content (including substantially similar content) to people in Singapore. The recipients of the direction are persons and entities who communicated such online content.\n(b) Disabling Direction . This requires online service providers to disable specified content (e.g. a post or page) on their service from the view of people in Singapore, which may include identical copies of the content.\n(c) Account Restriction Direction . This requires online service providers to stop an account on their service from communicating in Singapore and/or interacting with people in Singapore.\n(d) Access Blocking Direction . This requires internet service providers to block access to an online location such as a web domain from the view of people in Singapore.\n(e) App Removal Direction . This requires app stores to remove an app from its Singapore storefront, to stop further downloads of the app by people in Singapore.\n7. For a start, directions will be issued against scam websites and egregious online activities. This approach enables the Government to prioritise tackling scams and egregious offences, while developing the necessary systems and processes to scale up the issuance of directions for online activities in furtherance of the commission of other specified offences. Examples of egregious offences include, but are not restricted to, those related to threat of death and serious hurt, and threat to law-and-order.\n", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "SG", "row_key": "SG|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/commencement-of-the-online-criminal-harms-act-ocha-on-1-february-2024/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#TH.TH|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Computer-Related Crime Act covers persons providing internet access or other computer-mediated communication and persons storing data for others; a user is covered whether service is paid or free.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"6f9f1397cee9fedcc1cf6f7c1de69e67f4e7aa4793d163a1e69a943569ffcfeb\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.actor_scope\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"518f8cbe6cb53a59b8cf11df316c1646338a2e08312d55dea7bf70f828a2f6ab\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/TH/bodies/mdes-computer-crime.txt\",\"sha256\":\"e9eba0119e53ebedac3bcbc20335303c3fba757375d98bfe842f0988d328f31f\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Computer-Related Crime Act covers persons providing internet access or other computer-mediated communication and persons storing data for others; a user is covered whether service is paid or free.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "“traffic data” means any data relating to communication by means of a computer\nsystem, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration,\ntype of underlying service, or other information relating to communication of such a\ncomputer system.\n\n “service provider” means:\n\n (1) a person who, either in his own name or in the name or for the benefit of\nanother person, provides to other persons with access to the internet or the ability to\ncommunicate by other means through a computer system.\n\n (2) a person who stores computer data for the benefit of other persons.\n\n1\n Government Gazette, Volume 124 / Part 27 Gor / Page 4 / 18 June B.E. 2550 (A.D.2007).\n\n 1\n\f “user” means a person who uses the service of the service provider regardless of\nwhether with or without pay.\n\n “competent official” means a person appointed by the minister for the execution of\nthis Act.\n\n “Minister” means the Minister having charge and control of the execution of this Act.\n\n 2\n Section 4 The Minister of the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (the\n“Minister", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "actor_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "TH", "row_key": "TH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#TH.TH|whole.authority": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The Computer-Related Crime Act defines traffic data, service provider, user, competent official, and the minister charged with execution of the Act.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"6f9f1397cee9fedcc1cf6f7c1de69e67f4e7aa4793d163a1e69a943569ffcfeb\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.authority\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"518f8cbe6cb53a59b8cf11df316c1646338a2e08312d55dea7bf70f828a2f6ab\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/TH/bodies/mdes-computer-crime.txt\",\"sha256\":\"e9eba0119e53ebedac3bcbc20335303c3fba757375d98bfe842f0988d328f31f\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"The Computer-Related Crime Act defines traffic data, service provider, user, competent official, and the minister charged with execution of the Act.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "“traffic data” means any data relating to communication by means of a computer\nsystem, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration,\ntype of underlying service, or other information relating to communication of such a\ncomputer system.\n\n “service provider” means:\n\n (1) a person who, either in his own name or in the name or for the benefit of\nanother person, provides to other persons with access to the internet or the ability to\ncommunicate by other means through a computer system.\n\n (2) a person who stores computer data for the benefit of other persons.\n\n1\n Government Gazette, Volume 124 / Part 27 Gor / Page 4 / 18 June B.E. 2550 (A.D.2007).\n\n 1\n\f “user” means a person who uses the service of the service provider regardless of\nwhether with or without pay.\n\n “competent official” means a person appointed by the minister for the execution of\nthis Act.\n\n “Minister” means the Minister having charge and control of the execution of this Act.\n\n 2\n Section 4 The Minister of the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (the\n“Minister", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "authority", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "TH", "row_key": "TH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#TH.TH|whole.digital_id_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-06", "claim_type": null, "display": "DGA's Digital ID page describes OpenID as a central identity-verification (e-Authentication) system for the general public, with one account used across many services and single sign-on; the page describes the platform's purpose and does not state that its use is required.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"fresh_fetch_http_status\":200,\"fresh_fetch_sha256\":\"f86ac6f28654aa7c8d570ee7d7d3999e5af24fc031a27ad9690bdbf48b050d01\",\"read_in_full\":false,\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.digital_id_scope\",\"sections_read\":[\"DGA Digital ID knowledge base, page 1about, OpenID section\"],\"sections_read_bytes\":[{\"bytes\":702,\"citation\":\"DGA Digital ID knowledge base, page 1about, OpenID section\",\"path\":\"captures/sections/TH-DGA-openid.txt\",\"section\":\"DGA Digital ID page - OpenID platform\",\"sha256\":\"210103bf8813e185c51babe36c6f09aea946aed379a434281ce45b0410f65ef7\"}],\"sections_read_total_bytes\":702,\"snapshot_path\":\"captures/f86ac6f28654aa7c8d570ee7d7d3999e5af24fc031a27ad9690bdbf48b050d01.html\",\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"translation_note\":\"Author's English gloss: OpenID is a central identity-verification (e-Authentication) system for the general public, with one account used across many services and single sign-on; the page describes the platform's purpose and does not state that its use is required.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "ระบบยืนยันตัวบุคคลกลาง (e-Authentication) สำหรับบุคลลทั้่วไป หนึ่งบัญชีใช้กับหลายบริการ (One account all of Services) ทำหน้าที่ในการตรวจสอบการเข้าใช้งานระบบต่างๆ และใช้เทคโนโลยีที่เรียกว่า “OpenId” ที่จะทำให้ผู้ใช้งานสามารถเข้าใช้งานระบบต่างๆ ได้โดยที่ไม่ต้องล็อกอินซ้ำ ( Single Sign-On )", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "digital_id_scope", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "TH", "row_key": "TH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://kb.dga.or.th/digital-id/1about/", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#TH.TH|whole.exceptions": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Exercise of the powers in Computer-Related Crime Act Section 18(4)-(8) requires a petition to and order from the court with jurisdiction, stating the reasonable grounds and known details.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"6f9f1397cee9fedcc1cf6f7c1de69e67f4e7aa4793d163a1e69a943569ffcfeb\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.exceptions\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"518f8cbe6cb53a59b8cf11df316c1646338a2e08312d55dea7bf70f828a2f6ab\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/TH/bodies/mdes-computer-crime.txt\",\"sha256\":\"e9eba0119e53ebedac3bcbc20335303c3fba757375d98bfe842f0988d328f31f\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Exercise of the powers in Computer-Related Crime Act Section 18(4)-(8) requires a petition to and order from the court with jurisdiction, stating the reasonable grounds and known details.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "Section 19 18In exercising the authority of a competent official under Section 18(4),\n(5), (6), (7) and (8), the competent official shall file a petition with the court having\njurisdiction requesting for an order to permit such competent official to act in accordance\nwith the petition. The petition must specify a reasonable ground to believe that a person\ncommits or is going to commit any act which is an offence, a reason to exercise his/her\npower, the manner of commission of the offence, details relating to the equipment used in\ncommitting the offence and the offender, in so far that is known and can be specified as part\nof the petition. In considering such petition, the court shall consider such petition\nexpeditiously.\n\n After the relevant court has granted such order, prior to exercising his/her authority\nin accord with the court’s order, the competent official shall deliver to the owner or\npossessor of the computer system for keeping as an evidence, a copy of the note stating the\nreasonable ground(s) to believe and that such authority under Section 18(4), (5), (6), (7)\nand (8) must be exercised. In the event that no owner or possessor of the computer\nhardware (or system) is present there, the competent official shall later deliver a copy of\nsuch note to the owner or possessor of the computer hardware (or system) as soon as\npracticable.\n\n The competent official who leads the exercise of authority under Section 18(4), (5),\n(6), (7) and (8) must submit a copy of the report, describing the details of the exercise and\nreasons for such exercise to the court having jurisdiction within 48 hours from the time of\nthe exercise, as evidence.\n\n Making a copy or copies of computer data under Section 18(4) may be done", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "exceptions", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "TH", "row_key": "TH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#TH.TH|whole.messaging_rule": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "Licensed Application-to-Person SMS services must prevent a party without a registered sender name from sending consumer SMS and must verify every attached link before delivery under NBTC requirements.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": "{\"event_sha256\":\"bd0487b30e51d57e5738f96c449fc73210fd3133fc6f94f385789d32a080e0b8\",\"record_key\":\"comms.whole.messaging_rule\",\"record_revision_sha\":\"518f8cbe6cb53a59b8cf11df316c1646338a2e08312d55dea7bf70f828a2f6ab\",\"recorded_source_snapshot\":{\"path\":\"/Users/drew/personal/gascity/rigs/content-production/pp-exposure/runtime/w2_research_gov/TH/bodies/nbtc-a2p-sender-ocr.txt\",\"sha256\":\"c180f44b6767386f47ff90649cb55572a28b8e7918e9c594f794e75ad4287a9f\"},\"search_record\":null,\"source_status\":\"publish_ready\",\"source_value\":\"Licensed Application-to-Person SMS services must prevent a party without a registered sender name from sending consumer SMS and must verify every attached link before delivery under NBTC requirements.\"}", "public_reason": null, "publish_status": "publish_ready", "quote": "ข้อ๕ ผู้ให้บริการมีหน้าที่จัดการให้การลงทะเบียนผู้ใช้บริการเลขหมายโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่\nให้เป็นไปตามประกาศว่าด้วยการลงทะเบียนและการจัดเก็บข้อมูลผู้ใช้บริการโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ โดยให้\nดำเนินการ ดังนี้\n(๑) กรณีู้ลงทะเบียนใช้งานใหม่ ให้ผู้ให้บริการดำเนินการตรวจสอบความถูกต้องของข้อมูล\nผู้ลงทะเบียน โดยต้องดำเนินการให้แล้วเสร็จภายในเจ็ดวันนับแต่วันที่มีการลงทะเบียน\n() กรณีผู้ลงทะเบียน ตั้งแต่วันที่ ๑ มกราคม ๒๕๖๗ จนถึงวันที่ประกาศฉบับนี้มีผลใช้บังคับ\nให้ผู้ให้บริการมีหน้าที่ตรวจสอบความถูกต้องของข้อมูลผู้ลงทะเบียนให้แล้วเสร็จ ภายในเก้าสิบวันนับถัดจาก\nวันที่ประกาศฉบับนี้มีผลใช้บังคับ\n(๓) กรณีผู้ลงทะเบียน ก่อนปี พ.ศ. ๒๕๖๗ ให้ผู้ให้บริการมีหน้าที่ตรวจสอบความถูกต้อง\nของข้อมูลผู้ลงทะเบียน ให้แล้วเสร็จภายในหนึ่งปีนับถัดจากวันที่ประกาศฉบับนี้มีผลใช้บังคับ\nข้อ๖ ผู้รับใบอนุญาตสำหรับให้บริการส่งข้อความสั้น แบบแอปพลิเคชันซอฟต์แวร์ ไปยัง\nผู้ใช้งานโทรศัพท์มือถือที่มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อการสื่อสารกับผู้บริโภค (Application-to-Person : A2P)\nมีหน้าที่ห้ามมิให้ผู้ที่มิได้ลงทะเบียนชื่อผู้ส่งข้อความสั้น (Sender Name) ส่งข้อความสั้น และต้องตรวจสอบ\nความถูกต้องของลิงก์ที่ใช้แนบส่งข้อความสั้นทุกครั้งก่อนส่งข้อความสั้นไปยังผู้ใช้บริการปลายทางตามที่\nสำนักงาน กสทช. กำหนด\nข้อ๗ ผู้ให้บริการมีหน้าที่จำกัดการลงทะเบียนเลขหมายโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ของบุคคลต่างชาติ\nไม่เกินสามเลขหมายต่อหนึ่งคนต่อหนึ่งผู้ให้บริการ และให้ใช้หนังสือเดินทาง (Passport) ในการยืนยันตัวตน\nเพื่อลงทะเบียนผู้ใช้บริการเลขหมายโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่เท่านั้น\nข้อ๘ ผู้ให้บริการมีหน้าที่จำกัดระยะเวลาการใช้งานโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ของนักท่องเที่ยวต่างชาติ\n(Tourist SIM) ให้มีระยะเวลาการใช้งานไม่เกินหกสิบวัน โดยไม่สามารถเติมเงินเพื่อขยายระยะเวลา\nการใช้งานได้ ในกรณีที่นักท่องเที่ยวต่างชาติประสงค์ใช้งาน Tourist SIM ต่อภายหลังครบกำหนด\nระยะเวลา จะต้องดำเนินการลงทะเบียนยืนยันตัวตนกับผู้ให้บริการอีกครั้ง จึงจะขยายระยะเวลาการใช้งานได้\n\n--- PAGE 3 ---\nหน้า ๖๘\nเล่ม ๑๔๒ ตอนพิเศษ ๒๘๔ ง\nราชกิจจานุเบกษา\n๒๙ สิงหาคม ๒๕๖๘\nข้อ๙\nผู้ให", "readiness": "ready", "reason_code": null, "ref": { "cell_key": "messaging_rule", "grain": "m_communications_laws", "jurisdiction": "TH", "row_key": "TH|whole" }, "rendered": "value", "snapshot_path": null, "snapshot_resolved": false, "source_class": "S1", "source_sha256": null, "source_url": "https://ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/documents/84180.pdf", "table": "grain" }, "grain:m_communications_laws#US-GU.US-GU|whole.actor_scope": { "additional_sources": null, "capture_date": "2026-10-04", "claim_type": null, "display": "The cited process concerns law-enforcement officials seeking evidence through an independent judge, with probable cause shown to a court for the place to be searched.", "fetch_event_id": null, "pinpoint": 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Employers must perform prescribed right-to-work checks but are not universally required to use a digital route; from 1 October 2026, an employer choosing a digital verification service must use a qualifying certified service." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/end-to-end-encryption-and-child-safety/end-to-end-encryption-and-child-safety", "cell_locator": "GB.GB|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "The government states that it supports strong encryption and is not asking messaging services to stop implementing end-to-end encryption, while urging sufficient child-safety measures." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer", "cell_locator": "GB.GB|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "Online instant messaging services are among the services described as within the Act's user-to-user duties." } }, "jurisdiction": "GB", "last_checked": "2026-10-04", "official_source_url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer", "row_id": "GB|whole", "state": "United Kingdom" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "cell_locator": "GE.GE|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The statute's authorised-person category covers Commission-registered entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial entities that provide electronic communications networks or services; public-law entities qualify only where legislation expressly authorises them." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "cell_locator": "GE.GE|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The Electronic Communications Law supplies Georgia's national legal and economic framework, regulatory principles, Commission functions, and the rights and duties of persons owning, using, or providing electronic communications networks and services." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://sda.gov.ge/en/products/id-card/", "cell_locator": "GE.GE|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "The electronic identity card is the primary citizenship/identity document and can provide online authentication and qualified electronic signature. 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Communication content must be destroyed immediately and automatically after transmission, subject to the law's specified lawful-access channel." } }, "jurisdiction": "GE", "last_checked": "2026-10-04", "official_source_url": "https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620?impose=original", "row_id": "GE|whole", "state": "Georgia" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "cell_locator": "PT.PT|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The captured contract-information duty binds companies offering publicly available electronic communications services, except transmission services used for machine-to-machine services, and requires information to be given to consumers before contract formation." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "cell_locator": "PT.PT|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The annexed Electronic Communications Law defines the national regulatory authority as ANACOM and identifies its statutes as Decree-Law 39/2015." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0000600014.pdf", "cell_locator": "PT.PT|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "Chave Móvel Digital is an alternative, voluntary means for electronic authentication and qualified electronic signature; a citizen may associate a civil-identification number with one mobile number and may also associate an email address." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "cell_locator": "PT.PT|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "Private networks of the Ministry of National Defence and security or emergency forces and services are governed by specific legislation; the law also preserves measures for public security and order, criminal investigation, and defence." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "cell_locator": "PT.PT|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "Providers of number-based interpersonal communications that support value-added SMS or MMS must provide free blocking for services that send repeated or continuing messages or erotic or sexual content. Access may be activated generally or selectively only after the end user requests it in writing or through another durable medium available to that user." } }, "jurisdiction": "PT", "last_checked": "2026-10-04", "official_source_url": "https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/gratuitos/1s/2022/08/15700.pdf", "row_id": "PT|whole", "state": "Portugal" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "cell_locator": "PY.PY|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The captured framework addresses service operators holding concessions, licences, or authorisations and also applies specified secrecy protections to telecommunications personnel and users." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "cell_locator": "PY.PY|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "Law 642 classifies telecommunications services and assigns regulatory, licensing, control, and sanction functions to CONATEL." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://mitic.gov.py/autenticacion-en-dos-pasos-via-sms-sera-obligatorio-para-uso-de-identidad-electronica/", "cell_locator": "PY.PY|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "MITIC states that Identidad Electrónica will add mandatory SMS two-factor verification for access to principal state digital platforms; the announcement describes the change as forthcoming, not as an already-completed rollout." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "cell_locator": "PY.PY|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "The secrecy protection for communications and related information is subject to an express judicial-order exception." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "cell_locator": "PY.PY|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "Law 642 protects the secrecy and inviolability of telecommunications correspondence, subject to a judicial-order exception; the captured law does not make messaging use conditional on a separate identity enrollment." } }, "jurisdiction": "PY", "last_checked": "2026-10-04", "official_source_url": "https://www.bacn.gov.py/archivos/2452/20141013101650.pdf", "row_id": "PY|whole", "state": "Paraguay" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/OCHA2023?WholeDoc=1", "cell_locator": "SG.SG|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The Online Criminal Harms Act defines an online service provider as the provider of an online service and defines an online service as a service through which online activity can be conducted by internet access." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/TA1999?WholeDoc=1", "cell_locator": "SG.SG|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The Telecommunications Act 1999 includes statutory powers to license telecommunication systems and services and to issue telecommunications codes, performance standards, and directions." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.tech.gov.sg/products-and-services/for-citizens/digital-services/singpass/", "cell_locator": "SG.SG|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "Singpass is a trusted digital identity that allows residents to access government and business services online, with access to over 2,700 services across 800 government agencies and businesses." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/commencement-of-the-online-criminal-harms-act-ocha-on-1-february-2024/", "cell_locator": "SG.SG|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "Recipients of an OCHA direction, affected proprietors, and originators may seek reconsideration; an unsuccessful applicant may appeal to a Reviewing Tribunal." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/commencement-of-the-online-criminal-harms-act-ocha-on-1-february-2024/", "cell_locator": "SG.SG|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "For suspected specified offences, OCHA directions can require specified online content to stop, disable content, restrict accounts, block access, or remove apps; the initial focus is scams and egregious online activity." } }, "jurisdiction": "SG", "last_checked": "2026-10-06", "official_source_url": "https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/OCHA2023?WholeDoc=1", "row_id": "SG|whole", "state": "Singapore" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "cell_locator": "TH.TH|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The Computer-Related Crime Act covers persons providing internet access or other computer-mediated communication and persons storing data for others; a user is covered whether service is paid or free." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "cell_locator": "TH.TH|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The Computer-Related Crime Act defines traffic data, service provider, user, competent official, and the minister charged with execution of the Act." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://kb.dga.or.th/digital-id/1about/", "cell_locator": "TH.TH|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "DGA's Digital ID page describes OpenID as a central identity-verification (e-Authentication) system for the general public, with one account used across many services and single sign-on; the page describes the platform's purpose and does not state that its use is required." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "cell_locator": "TH.TH|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "Exercise of the powers in Computer-Related Crime Act Section 18(4)-(8) requires a petition to and order from the court with jurisdiction, stating the reasonable grounds and known details." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/documents/84180.pdf", "cell_locator": "TH.TH|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "Licensed Application-to-Person SMS services must prevent a party without a registered sender name from sending consumer SMS and must verify every attached link before delivery under NBTC requirements." } }, "jurisdiction": "TH", "last_checked": "2026-10-06", "official_source_url": "https://www.mdes.go.th/law/detail/3618-COMPUTER", "row_id": "TH|whole", "state": "Thailand" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawful-access", "cell_locator": "US.US|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The cited lawful-access process concerns law-enforcement access to evidence after an independent judge finds probable cause; it does not create a general identity duty for all communication users." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep514/usrep514334/usrep514334.pdf", "cell_locator": "US.US|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The Supreme Court treats an author's choice to remain anonymous as protected First Amendment expression, while the holding is context-specific rather than a universal immunity." }, "digital_id_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.login.gov/about-us/", "cell_locator": "US.US|whole.digital_id_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "digital_id_scope", "value": "Login.gov is a single sign-on and identity-verification service for participating government websites and applications, not a general identity credential required across the public internet." }, "exceptions": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawful-access", "cell_locator": "US.US|whole.exceptions", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "exceptions", "value": "Privacy, anonymity, and encryption do not eliminate judicially authorized investigative process: warrants or wiretap orders require a court showing of probable cause." }, "messaging_rule": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawful-access", "cell_locator": "US.US|whole.messaging_rule", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "messaging_rule", "value": "DOJ describes encryption as essential for protecting communications and privacy, while identifying warrant-proof end-to-end encryption as an obstacle to court-authorized access; the cited policy page states no general ban on encrypted messaging." } }, "jurisdiction": "US", "last_checked": "2026-10-04", "official_source_url": "https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawful-access", "row_id": "US|whole", "state": "United States" }, { "cells": { "actor_scope": { "cell_citation_url": "https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawful-access", "cell_locator": "US-GU.US-GU|whole.actor_scope", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "actor_scope", "value": "The cited process concerns law-enforcement officials seeking evidence through an independent judge, with probable cause shown to a court for the place to be searched." }, "authority": { "cell_citation_url": "https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep514/usrep514334/usrep514334.pdf", "cell_locator": "US-GU.US-GU|whole.authority", "publish_status": "publish_ready", "source_field": "authority", "value": "The U.S. Supreme Court, applying the First Amendment in McIntyre v. 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